

**A CRITICAL EXAMINATION  
OF  
IMMANUEL KANT'S PHILOSOPHY**

**A Critical Examination  
Of  
Immanuel Kant's Philosophy**

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*Dedicated*  
*To*  
*My Revered Brother*  
*Late Sri Yogendra Pratap Singh*  
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## PREFACE

The present work is a slightly revised and extended version of a Doctoral thesis which was approved for the Ph D Degree of the Jawaharlal Nehru University during 1985. The contents of this book furnish an objective, critical and comprehensive account of the ontological, epistemological and moral issues involved in the philosophical system of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

Kant's Philosophy, undoubtedly, constitutes one of the most important components of European philosophical thought. The significance of his epistemology consists not only in the attempt at reconciling the claims of rationalism and empiricism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but also in raising certain problems of epistemology on the basis of which there develops the idealism of Fichte and Hegel on the one hand, and the dialectical materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the other.

In order to trace the origin and development of Kant's philosophy, it has to be seen in its historical perspective. The philosophical bearings of his predecessors, particularly Aristotle, St Anselm, St Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, exercise tremendous influence in shaping of the important aspects of Kantian thought. So also is the influence of scientists like Newton.

Amid the two conflicting trends of rationalism and empiricism, Kant critically investigates the capacities of both reason and sensibility. He brings out certain antinomies inherent in reason itself and such antinomies, he claims, cannot be resolved. Hegel attempts to overcome those antinomies, but he does so within the framework of absolute idealism. It is on this point that Marx's dialectical materialism may be viewed as an amendment of the flaws of Kant's philosophy which vitiate its Hegelian development.

It is my great privilege to have the opportunity to express what I owe to my revered teacher Dr (Mrs) Suman Gupta's

## Introduction

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant arises out of the distinction as well as interrelation of the three aspects of his ontology—namely, noumenon, thing-in-itself and phenomenon. Ontology may be defined as a branch of philosophy which deals with the theory of being, for example, the theory of what really exists in contrast with what only seems to exist, of what permanently and unconditionally exists in contrast with what exists temporarily, dependently and conditionally. In the written announcement of lectures given from 1765 to 1766, Kant says, "In ontology, I discuss the more general properties of things, the difference between spiritual and material beings "

From this point of view, the concept of noumenon is what constitutes the spiritualist aspect of Kant's ontology wherein lies the basis of his moral laws. He advocated the possibility of moral laws by postulating immortality of the soul, freedom of the will and existence of God. These are the ideas of reason and the postulates of moral laws in Kant. Distinct from the concept of noumenon, the concept of thing-in-itself presents the materialist aspect of his ontology. It is something like the unknown substratum of John Locke. Just as for Locke, the material substance exists independent of the human

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mind and it is the cause of our sensation, similarly for Kant, the thing-in-itself exists independent of the human mind and it is the ground and cause of appearances. For Locke as well as for Kant, the material substance is unknown and unknowable. But whereas in Locke, through the knowledge of the primary qualities which are inseparable from the material substance in whatsoever estate it be, we are, however, acquainted with the material substance, in Kant, the thing-in-itself transcends the logical applicability of the categories of understanding. Moreover, the material substance, in Locke, is the ontology; in Kant, it is a category of understanding and it is not identical with the thing-in-itself, because the material substance as a category of understanding is dependent on the human mind whereas the thing-in-itself is not. In Kant's analysis, the thing-in-itself is what furnishes the material basis to which the categories of understanding are applied. He confines human cognition to the extent in so far as a thing can be perceived by sensible intuition and is determined by the categories of understanding. The result of the two-stage process is synthesized by the transcendental unity of apperception and knowledge which is thus constituted is what Kant designates as a phenomenon. Therefore, epistemological problems, for Kant, arise out of the distinction as well as relation between what is cognizable in principle, i.e., phenomenon, and what is incognizable, i.e., noumenon and thing-in-itself.

In the context of Kant's epistemology, I have discussed its possibility, validity and limit. His analysis of epistemology begins with the critical estimate of the two opposing traditions of rationalism and empiricism. He tries to justify the claims of the rationalists by formulating the forms of intuition (space and time) and the forms of understanding (the categories) as a priori. These concepts and categories cannot own their origin to sensible intuition.

Kant, in his analysis of space and time, maintains that these are a priori possessions of the human mind and therefore cannot be derived from sensible intuition. For him space and time are not absolute because they are dependent on the human mind in general. In this context, he differs from Newton and Locke for whom, space and time are absolute,

eternal and independent of the mind, while for Kant, though the thing-in-itself exists independent of the mind, space and time are mind-dependent and cannot be applied to thing-in-itself. Kant states that space and time are logically prior to sensible intuition through which a material object is given to us. But every sensible intuition has to be posited and ordered in the a priori forms of space and time. The sensible intuitions, synthesized in the forms of space and time, become the objects of knowledge for Kant. They are brought to the faculty of understanding which through its categories organizes them.

In his analysis of categories, Kant agrees with Aristotle that without them there is no possibility of knowledge whatsoever. But he criticizes Aristotle's views that categories are the fundamental features of the sensible world and that they provide both the content and the form of knowledge. Contrary to Aristotle, he deduces categories from understanding which is regarded by him as the faculty of judgement. He expounds twelve kinds of judgements and deduces a category from each of them. On this basis Kant regards categories as a priori and as empty without sensible intuitions. He, therefore, criticizes rationalism because it cannot demonstrate the sphere of the validity of a priori concepts. In this context, Kant accepts the claims of the empiricists that a thing can be given only through sense perception. But he criticizes the empiricists on the grounds that they cannot demonstrate the means through which sensibility is organized. The empiricists have confined human cognition to what is merely synthetic which, for him, is blind and meaningless without the a priori concepts. In order to give meaning to synthetic propositions, they have to be determined by the a priori concepts. What we experience is universal and necessary only by virtue of the a priori activity of human mind. Kant, therefore, circumscribes sensible intuition to the expanse of reason in the rationalist tradition and introduces definiteness to the empiricist notion of knowledge by the a priori concepts. Consequently, knowledge is neither purely a priori as the rationalists maintain, nor purely synthetic as the empiricists hold, but is synthetic a priori.

Human cognition as synthetic a priori is possible through the transcendental unity of apperception which perceives all

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things and events in the form of space and time, and comprehends them under the categories of quantity, quality, substantiality, causality, reciprocity, etc. The transcendental unity of apperception provides the highest unity to the sensible intuition through the categories of understanding. It is the ultimate subject of knowledge and it provides universality and necessity to the objects of knowledge and thus gives the knowledge of phenomenon. The unity of apperception depends on the materials provided by the thing-in-itself which acts on our senses. Thus there is relationship between epistemology and the thing-in-itself in Kant. But the thing-in-itself transcends the possibility of knowledge because it can never be comprehended in sensible intuition.

Kant's concept of the existence of thing-in-itself as the ground and cause of appearance and yet as unknown and unknowable involves certain contradictions. These have been discussed on the basis of the criticisms levelled by Fichte (1762-1814) and Hegel (1770-1831) on the one hand, and Marx (1818-86), Engels (1820-95) and Lenin (1870-1924) on the other. The attempts of Fichte and Hegel are aimed at abolishing Kant's thing-in-itself because it conforms the ontological existence of matter independent of consciousness and it cannot be accepted within the framework of their idealism. Contrary to such idealist approaches towards Kant's thing-in-itself, Marx, Engels and Lenin justify his claim for the thing-in-itself but regard it as essentially knowable.

Fichte and Hegel find a self-contradiction and an impossible abstraction involved in Kant's thing-in-itself. Kant assumes the existence of the thing-in-itself on the basis that there must be an external cause to our sensibility. But causation, according to him, is a category of understanding and as such it is inapplicable to the thing-in-itself. This contradiction can also not be resolved by regarding the thing-in-itself as the ground of appearances because the ground itself is nothing but the category of cause unschematized. On this basis, Fichte and Hegel observe a dualism between phenomenon and thing-in-itself in Kant, because the material element in the phenomenal world is provided by the thing-in-itself which exists independent of the phenomenal world.



In order to eliminate this dualism, Fichte, as a subjective idealist, postulates the existence of an ego, which in postulating its own existence, necessarily assumes the existence of a non-ego which is dependent on the ego. At the same time, as an objective idealist he regards both the ego and the non-ego as dependent on the absolute ego, in which one ego is distinguished from another ego and also from the non-ego external to it. The absolute ego is where the identity and the opposition between an ego and a non-ego is grasped.

Hegel, as an absolute idealist, attempts to build his panlogism by rejecting Kant's thing-in-itself lying outside the precincts of cognate consciousness. He considers the real world to be the realization of some premundane absolute idea and human spirit, while comprehending the real world, comprehends in it and through it the absolute idea. Hegel attempts to overcome the unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself by giving an interpretation of understanding, reason and dialectics different from that of Kant. Kant's term understanding with its categories is in immediate relation to the objects given in the manifold of sensible intuition. But he confines understanding to the sphere of phenomenon and the knowledge which it provides is the knowledge of what he calls the conditioned. As different from understanding, reason, in Kant's opinion, has no relation to the objects. But reason seeks to get the imitations of the unconditioned on the basis that if the conditioned is given, then all its conditions and thereby the absolute unconditioned must also be given. But reason fails to present the unconditioned in reality because whatever can be presented in reality is always conditioned. Therefore, the unconditioned is regarded by Kant as an idea of reason. On this basis there arises a conflict between idea and reality and this conflict is what gives rise to the antinomies of pure reason where Kant uses his dialectics as a method of exposing transcendental illusions and claims to curb what he regards as the dogmatic pretensions of reason by preventing it from presenting the unconditioned in reality.

Hegel disagrees with Kant in regard to the meaning of the terms understanding and reason, and he strongly criticizes Kantian dialectics. According to Hegel, understanding makes

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its object the antithesis between the individual and the universal, and the task of reason is to reconcile the opposites and sublimate them in unity. Hence reason has its relation to the objects. In Hegel's dialectics, all being is realized by reason and all becoming is a development of reason, and if all that is real is a manifestation of reason and each thing is a stage, a modification of reason, then reason and real are identical. The absolute unconditioned, which for Kant is an idea of reason, becomes the starting point in Hegelian dialectics and is realized by reason in the process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. On this basis, Hegel rejects the unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself and gives arguments to show that 'to be' and 'to be known' are one and the same thing.

But the arguments of Fichte and Hegel towards thing-in-itself suffer from certain shortcomings. Both of them are opposed to the ontological existence of matter which is conformed in it. Hegel, as a matter of fact, approaches it from a consistent idealist standpoint which in itself is an assumption of the existence of matter dependent on mind. But the thing-in-itself as the ground and cause of appearances conforms the ontological existence of matter independent of the mind. Therefore, while tracing the development of Hegel's philosophy on the basis of Kant's epistemology, we have tried to show that the thing-in-itself cannot be rejected. This, however, does not mean that a justification of thing-in-itself is at the same time a justification of its being unknown and unknowable. On the contrary, we have attempted to bring out the various shortcomings involved in Kant's epistemological situation due to which the thing-in-itself remains unknown and unknowable. In this context, we have attempted not only to point out the shortcomings in his epistemology, but also to show what can be done to amend it and with what consequences? We have tried to expound an epistemology through which the thing-in-itself (material substance), though existing independent of the human mind, will be essentially knowable.

The basic shortcoming lies in Kant's attempt towards subjectifying space-time and categories, whereas they are essentially objective. Whereas universality and necessity in human cogni-

tion are derived from centuries of man's practical activity through interaction with objective reality, Kant regards them as a priori and logically prior to sensible intuition. As opposed to Kant's position, we have tried to show that the cognitive process starts from man's interaction with objective reality. We agree with Marx that knowledge can neither occur nor develop without its relation to action, the aim of which is to change what is known, which is possible only in the continual process of grasping the causal laws of the development of objective reality. An epistemological situation of this nature shows that human thought would function and develop only through its interaction with objective reality. Consequently, the laws of human thought are inseparably linked with the laws of objective reality and the essence of such a unity lies in creating certain new things and relations. Such a unity assures our knowledge of a thing not only as it appears to us, but also as it is in itself. With the unity among epistemology, logic and ontology, it can be shown that the thing-in-itself (material substance), existing independent of human consciousness, is essentially knowable and there is no limit to the extent of human cognition.

But Kant limits human cognition to the sphere of the phenomenon. Such an attempt is aimed at justifying the realm of faith wherein lies the basis of his moral laws. Kant expounds moral laws through his concept of freedom of the will and regards them as autonomous. His moral laws are expressed in the form of categorical imperatives and they are obeyed for their own sake. In his analysis, moral laws do not require the knowledge of objective reality where they have to be performed. Therefore, his epistemology and morality fall so widely apart that there remains an unbridgeable gulf between the is and the ought, between action and willing, between necessity and freedom.

Contrary to Kant's position, I have tried to show that the cognitive aspect of objective reality is indispensable for the formulation and obedience of moral laws and it is the cognition of objective reality which, through its process of development, bridges the gulf between the is and the ought, between action and willing, between necessity and freedom, and thereby actua-

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lizes the ideality of ought, willing and freedom in the reality of concrete human affairs. On this basis, epistemology, ontology and morality can be regarded as dialectically interrelated

In the following pages an attempt has been made to critically examine Kant's philosophy in the light of both idealist and materialist philosophers who came after him.

# The Basis of Kant's Philosophy

## Distinction and Connection of Noumenon, Thing-in-Itself and Phenomenon

It is first of all necessary to clarify and examine the basis of Kant's philosophy which lies in the relations as well as differences among noumenon, thing-in-itself and phenomenon. The totality of these three concepts constitutes the sphere of his ontology. They perform two functions—on the one hand, they separate the realm of the spiritual (noumenal) from the sphere of the phenomenal world, and, on the other hand, they provide a materialist basis to Kant's ontology. The materialist aspect of his ontology consists in his concept of the thing-in-itself. It may be pointed out at the outset that many times Kant uses noumenon and thing-in-itself as identical concepts, but the distinction between them cannot be ignored. These concepts are also related to the distinction he makes between reason and understanding.

Kant conceives two completely distinct ontological concepts, with no mediating transitions—the concept of noumena and the concept of phenomena. The former constitutes the realm of the spiritual where lies the basis of Kantian morality and it is free from the applicability of the categories like quantity, quality, cause effect, etc. The latter is the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge wherein the categories have their applicability. The distinction between noumena and

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phenomena is based upon Kant's thesis that scientific knowledge has its jurisdiction within the world of phenomenon and that there is a realm of spiritual wherein science cannot penetrate. He limits the sphere of scientific knowledge to phenomenon in order "to leave room for faith"<sup>1</sup>. The sphere of faith, where scientific knowledge cannot penetrate, is regarded by him as the sphere of noumenon. In the context of noumena as opposed to phenomena, Kant writes

"Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are called phenomena. But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding and which, nevertheless, can be given as such to an intuition .. Such things would be entitled noumena".<sup>2</sup>

According to him, an object is "...given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions ."<sup>3</sup> The intuitions, which are yielded by sensibility, are regarded by Kant as sensible intuitions. The manifolds of sensible intuitions, in so far as they are not determined by the categories of understanding, are the "appearances"<sup>4</sup>. But when they are determined in accordance with the unity of the categories, they become phenomena. Thus human cognition is confined to the sphere of phenomena ; that is to say, it is confined to the extent in so far as an object can be given in sensible intuition and is determined by the unity of the categories.

On this basis, Kant states that there must be something which can never be given in a manifold of sensible intuition but which can, however, be regarded as an object of understanding. Such a thing he designates as noumenon.

Kant defines noumenon in two senses, namely, negative and positive. In the negative sense, it means "... a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it ."<sup>5</sup> In the positive sense, it is

1 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*; Tr. Dent and Sons by J M D Meiklejohn J M Dent and Sons, London, 1956, Introduction, p. xx

2 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, Tr by N K. Smith The Macmillan Press Ltd London, 1973, pp 263-6

3 Ibid, p. 65.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p. 268.

".. an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual ."<sup>6</sup> But this intellectual intuition ' . is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility"<sup>7</sup> Therefore man can never comprehend the noumenon because the intellectual intuition which comprehends noumenon is of a special kind which he can never possess. The concept of intellectual intuition is based on Kant's assumption that, " .we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition"<sup>8</sup> Therefore, there must be an intellectual intuition in which noumenon can be given.

Further the concept of noumenon is regarded by Kant as problematic in which its affirmation or negation is taken as merely possible or optional. This is so, because there is no sensible intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible sensible intuition, through which noumenon as outside the field of sensibility can be given. Therefore, the concepts of understanding cannot be employed assertively on the noumenon and the noumenon can be regarded only as problematic and it can be thought only, " . under the title of an unknown something"<sup>9</sup>

The concepts of noumena being unknown and unknowable are regarded by Kant as ideas of reason which are transcendent. He postulates the ideas of reason because he holds that there must be a sphere of the unconditioned. It is in this sense that the ideas of reason, which are transcendent, differ from the categories of understanding which are transcendental. Ideas of reason have no applicability to the phenomena, whereas no knowledge of phenomenon is possible without the application of the categories of understanding. Kant holds that in the phenomenal world, everything is conditioned, but reason is not satisfied with what is merely conditioned and therefore, reason seeks to get the concept of unconditioned. According to him the concept of unconditioned can never exist in the phenomenal world because whatever exists in the phenomenal world

6 Ibid

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid , p 271

9 Ibid., p 273

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is always conditioned. Therefore he regards the unconditioned as an "idea"; and since the unconditioned is a demand of reason, so it can be regarded as an idea of reason. In his analysis there are three ideas of reason, namely immortality of the soul, freedom of the will and existence of God. Therefore the concept of noumenon constitutes the idealist aspect of his ontology and it remains unknown and unknowable. But the concept of phenomenon constitutes the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge. The phenomenon and noumenon are two different aspects of Kant's ontology.

Further, in Kant's analysis, the concept of noumenon and the concept of thing-in-itself are also two different ontological concepts. He assumes the existence of things-in-themselves on the basis that when appearances are given through the manifold of sensible intuitions then there must exist something as the ground of appearances. Kant therefore, says, "things-in-themselves must lie behind the appearances as their ground"<sup>10</sup>

The acceptance of things-in-themselves as the ground of appearances is based on his assumption that "behind the appearances we must admit and assume something else which is not an appearance—namely, things-in-themselves—although, since we can never be acquainted with these, but only with the way in which they affect us, we must resign ourselves to the fact that we can never get any nearer to them and can never know what they are in themselves"<sup>11</sup>

Thus things-in-themselves exist as the ground of appearances, they are something which affect our senses and are the cause of appearances. But they can never be given in a manifold of sensible intuitions and the categories of understanding cannot be applied to them. Therefore they remain unknown and unknowable. Thus we can know things only in so far as they are given to us in manifold of sensible intuitions and for that matter in appearances, and are determined by the categories: but things-in-themselves are unknown and unknowable. Kant says, "...appearances are only representations of things which are un-

10 H. J. Paton *The Moral Law, Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1969, p. 119

11 *Ibid*, p. 111



known as regards what they may be in-themselves".<sup>12</sup> Thus appearances are the representations of the unknown and unknowable things in-themselves. In this sense, the thing-in-itself is related to the sphere of phenomenon, because the material element in the phenomenal world depends on the thing-in-itself.

Things-in-themselves as the ground and cause of appearances, according to Lenin can be regarded as the "materialist basis"<sup>13</sup> of Kant's ontology. Lenin points out that when Kant is accepting this then he is accepting the independent existence of matter as the ontology in his philosophy.

Kant's concept of thing-in-itself may be regarded as "an unknown substratum"<sup>14</sup> which constitutes the ontological existence of material substance in John Locke (1632-1704). Locke maintains that all our knowledge is derived from sense experience which is caused by material substance. But Locke states that material substance is unknown and unknowable, despite the fact that it causes our sensations, and is copied in our ideas.

Locke's conception of material substance involves certain inconsistencies. They are evident from his initial position that, on the one hand, he asserts that material substance is unknown and unknowable, on the other hand, he states that we can know the primary qualities which "are inseparable from the body in what estate soever it be"<sup>15</sup>. The primary qualities like solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number, according to Locke, exactly correspond to the material substance, while the secondary qualities like colour, taste, smell, sound etc are "...nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities".<sup>16</sup> These secondary qualities do not correspond to the material objects but are caused by the primary qualities. Thus Locke's conception of material substance as unknown and unknowable is not

12 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, by Tr N.K. Smith, p 173

13 V.I. Lenin *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 86

14 John Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* ed by J.W. Yolton · Dent · London/Dutton · New York, 1977, p 310.

15 Ibid., p. 60.

16 Ibid., p. 61.

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consistent because we have some knowledge of it ; that is to say, we have knowledge of material substance, at least, in terms of its primary qualities.

This conception, despite the fact that it involves certain contradictions, has an independent existence from our knowledge of it. It can, therefore, be regarded as the materialist basis of Locke's ontology

Similarly, by accepting the independent existence of things-in-themselves behind the appearances, Kant supplies a materialist basis to his ontology. Therefore things-in-themselves are different from noumena which are regarded by him as ideas of reason. Noumena are neither the ground nor the cause of the appearances, because they can never affect our senses and nor be conceived in terms of existence. But he has emphasized on the existence of the things-in-themselves and has regarded appearances as their representations. In this context Lenin has rightly pointed out that Kant, through his conception of noumenon, becomes an idealist, while through the conception of things-in-themselves, he is a materialist. Lenin says:

"The principal feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism, a compromise between the two, the combination within one system of heterogeneous and contrary philosophical trends"<sup>17</sup>

Those who interpret Kant idealistically usually equate things-in-themselves with noumena. For example, Prof H.W. Cassirer has said, "Kant's theory of things-in-themselves can be rendered acceptable only by being connected as closely as possible with his view on intellectual intuition"<sup>18</sup>. As discussed earlier Kant's conception of noumena can be given in intellectual intuition and not at all in the sensible intuition. Therefore Prof Cassirer, in order to equate things-in-themselves with the noumena, tries to conceive things-in-themselves also through intellectual intuition. But Kant maintains that things-in-themselves exist as the ground of appearances yielded by

17 V I Lenin . *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp 179-80.

18 H W Cassirer *Kant's First Critique An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1968, p. 216

sensible intuition. So far as noumena are concerned, he maintains that they can never be conceived in existence and can never be regarded as the ground and cause of appearances. Prof Cassirer, in order to refute the materialist basis of Kantian ontology, attempts to conceive things-in-themselves also through intellectual intuition and thus regards them as synonymous with noumena

Similar arguments have been offered by Prof S Korner who tries to identify things-in themselves with noumena, saying that, "they are entities of the understanding to which no objects of experience can ever correspond, and contrast them with 'phenomena' which are or can be objects of experience"<sup>19</sup> But the fact is that knowledge of phenomena, according to Kant, is possible only in so far as the things-in-themselves act on our senses and thus furnish the material element in human cognition, whereas noumena have no relation to appearances and for that matter to phenomena Regarding the differences between thing-in itself and noumena, Theodore Ozierman points out :

"In his theory, a 'thing-in itself' is not an idea of pure reason, that is, the key premise of transcendental aesthetics, that is, the theory of sensation 'Things-in-themselves' affect our senses As for the noumena, they have nothing in common with sense perception or with the cognitive process in general,"<sup>20</sup>

From all this it follows that things-in-themselves and noumena are distinct ontological concepts and any attempt to equate them is to misinterpret Kant's ontology and reject the materialist basis of his philosophy.

It may be noted that Kant, at certain places, has used noumena and things-in-themselves as identical terms For instance, he writes :

"The concept of noumenon, that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as object of senses but as thing-in itself, solely through a pure understanding—is not in any way contradictory.

19 S Korner *Kant* Penguin Books, 1960, p 94.

20 Theodore Ozierman . *Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy* . Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 145.

For, we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible-kind of intuition. Further the concept of noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things-in-themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge<sup>21</sup>

Here Kant explains the concept of noumenon in two different ways. On the one hand he says that the concept of noumenon is a thing-in-itself and can be thought only through pure understanding and can never be regarded as an object of senses. This conception of noumenon is based upon his thesis that sensible intuition cannot be regarded as the only possible kind of intuition. Therefore, he conceives a kind of intellectual intuition and asserts that the concept of noumenon, as a thing-in-itself, can be given in the intellectual intuition. On the other hand, he says that the concept of noumenon is necessary to prevent sensible intuitions from being extended to things-in-themselves. Here one can notice a specific and significant distinction between noumenon and thing-in-itself, where he regards noumenon as a "limiting concept"<sup>22</sup> whose function is "to curb the pretensions of sensibility"<sup>23</sup>. Thus it is not the thing-in-itself which limits the manifold of sensible intuitions from being applied to it, but it is the concept of noumenon which limits the sensible intuition from being applied to thing-in-itself. But immediately after giving such a clear distinction between the concept of noumenon and thing-in-itself, Kant again creates a confusion by saying, "The remaining things, to which it does not apply, are entitled noumena, in order to show that this knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the understanding thinks"<sup>24</sup>.

Such confusions are, of course, there in Kant's conception of noumenon and thing-in-itself. But one may point out that the concept of thing-in-itself is never a limiting concept in Kantian philosophy and when he regards thing-in-itself as unknown

21 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* · Tr by N K Smith, pp 271-2

22 Ibid., p 272

23 Ibid

24 Ibid

and unknowable, he does so "by applying the term noumena to things-in-themselves"<sup>25</sup>

Thus it is the concept of noumenon, as a limiting concept, which prevents sensible intuitions from being extended to thing-in-itself and limits the sphere of human cognition in order to leave room for faith

The sphere of faith constitutes the realm of the spiritual wherein lies the basis of his moral laws. The noumenal entities, i.e. immortality of the soul, freedom of the will and the existence of God, are regarded by Kant as the postulates of morality. Scientific knowledge is doomed to disappointment if it tries to penetrate into these entities, because none of them can belong to the phenomenal world. Therefore Kant regards them as a matter of faith and as postulates of morality.

From the above, it is clear that noumenon, thing-in-itself and phenomenon are three distinct as well as related aspects of Kant's ontology. The concept of noumenon constitutes the idealist aspect but the concept of thing-in-itself presents the materialist basis of his philosophy. The concept of phenomenon is the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge. It is the product of the unity of apperception which provides the form and the thing-in-itself which furnishes the material element.

However, there are certain inconsistencies involved in Kant's concept of the things-in-themselves. Their existence is assumed on the basis that there must be an external cause of the appearances. Thus, on the one hand, appearances are alleged to be caused by the things-in-themselves; on the other hand, things-in-themselves cannot be regarded as the cause because causation is a category of the understanding and categories do not apply to things-in-themselves. This contradiction cannot be resolved by regarding things-in-themselves as the ground of appearances, because it is a subterfuge, a mere change of words without any real change of meaning. Criticizing Kantian thing-in-itself, W. T. Stace writes :

"...even if we say that the thing-in-itself is not a cause, but that it, nevertheless, exists, this position is firstly, still self-contradictory, and secondly, quite gratuitous. It is self-

<sup>25</sup> Ibid , p 273.

contradictory because, though it drops the category of cause, it still applies to the thing-in-itself the category of existence, and this contradicts the fundamental Kantian position that none of the categories apply to it. It is gratuitous because, if the thing-in-itself is not the cause of our sensation, there is ground for assuming its existence."<sup>26</sup>

Thus Kant's conception of the existence of thing-in-itself, as the ground and cause of appearances, is self-contradictory. Kantian thing-in-itself is also not consistent, when it is regarded as unknown and unknowable, because, "if we know that a thing exists and is a cause, we know that the concepts of existence and causation apply to it. We have, therefore, some knowledge of it, and it is not unknowable or even unknown."<sup>27</sup>

But Kantian thing-in-itself, despite the fact that it involves certain contradictions and shortcomings, has its own significance, because it represents the materialist basis of human cognition. The basic shortcoming lies in Kant's epistemology because he regards categories as inapplicable to the thing-in-itself. This problem will be discussed later. Here it may be pointed out that the categories are derived by man through his centuries of practical and cognitive activities upon material things. They reflect the fundamental and universal connections and properties of things, not only as they appear to us, but also as they are in themselves. Therefore, our knowledge of a thing is not only as it appears to us, but also as it is in-itself. Consequently there is no such difference between phenomenon and thing-in-itself. In this context, Lenin says:

"There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and thing-in-itself, and there cannot be any such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other inventions to the

26 W T Stace. *The Philosophy of Hegel* Dover Publications, Inc New York, 1955, pp. 43-4.

27 Ibid, p 44

effect that the thing-in-itself is beyond phenomena .. is the sheerest nonsense."<sup>28</sup>

It may be pointed out that there is a distinction between unknown and unknowable. There are, of course, millions of things unknown to us. But they are unknown, not because they are in-themselves, but because we are too far away to acquire a knowledge of them. According to Lenin, there is nothing unknowable in principle and Kant has misunderstood the problems of epistemology by regarding the constitution of human mind as incapable of knowing thing-in-itself, something from which human mind is totally cut-off, something which is outside any conceivable human knowledge, not by distance, lack of conceptual apparatus and the like, but by the very nature of our cognitive process. According to Lenin :

"The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotches is practice, namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian incomprehensible 'thing in-itself'."<sup>29</sup>

Lenin, thus, states that human cognition is based on practice and if in his practical activity man is able to realize the correctness of his conception of things by making things serve his own purposes, then the things cannot be regarded as unknown and unknowable. Lenin further says :

"In the theory of knowledge, as 'in every other sphere of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact."<sup>30</sup>

Thus one will find millions of examples of such development of knowledge not only in the history of the progress of science and technology, but also in the everyday activity of one's life, "...the transformation of 'things-in-themselves' into 'things-

28 V I Lenin *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp. 87-8.

29 Ibid, p. 86.

30 Ibid, p. 88.

for-us" <sup>31</sup> It may be pointed out that Lenin does not equate things-in-themselves with the things-for us, because "... the thing-in-itself is distinct from the thing-for-us for the latter is only a part, or only one aspect, of the former" <sup>32</sup> He holds that the known or the thing-for-us is a part of the greater unknown—or the thing-in-itself, but the latter is never unknowable because it can be known through the practical and cognitive activity of human beings.

In this way, Kant's thing-in-itself as unknowable has been refuted by Lenin. According to Lenin, Kant's thing-in-itself as the ground and cause of appearances, is unknown to a greater extent, but it is never unknowable. Lenin, thus, justifies Kant's claim for the thing-in-itself because it constitutes the materialist basis of Kant's ontology. But the knowability of the thing-in-itself cannot be conceived within the framework of Kant's philosophy, because he has misunderstood the problems of epistemology.

However, Kant's successors, particularly Fichte and Hegel attempt to abolish Kant's thing-in-itself altogether because it cannot be accepted within the framework of their idealism. Fichte criticizes the thing-in-itself because it contradicts his concept of phenomenon and thus creates a "dualism between phenomena and things in-themselves" <sup>33</sup> In order to resolve this dualism, Fichte states that the first and fundamental principle is the "... postulation of its own existence by the ego . and the ego, in postulating its own existence, necessarily assumes the existence of non-ego" <sup>34</sup> Fichte tries to reject Kant's thing-in-itself by making the object or the non-ego dependent on the subject, or the ego, whereas in Kant the objects are possible when the thing-in-itself, which exists independent of the subject or the transcendental consciousness, acts on human senses. Fichte, in this way, becomes a subjective idealist. And on this

31 Ibid

32 V.I. Lenin *Collected Works*; Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, Vol 14, p 119.

33 Stanley Rosen *GWF Hegel—An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*; New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1974, p. 87.

34 Ibid., p. 280



basis he attempts to abolish the ontological existence of matter conformed in Kant's thing-in-itself. Further, in Fichte, both the ego and the non ego are based on the "absolute ego .. which creates an experience in which selves are distinguished from one another and from the objects they assume to be external to them .."<sup>35</sup> Thus Fichte is ultimately an objective idealist because he regards both the ego and the non ego as dependent on the absolute ego in which an ego can assume its existence and the existence of objects external to it. Therefore Kant's thing-in-itself is closer to truth than Fichte's non-ego

Hegel also rejects the thing-in-itself lying outside the ambit of cognate consciousness. He does so by providing an interpretation of understanding and reason different from that of Kant. In Kant's analysis, understanding has no jurisdiction over the thing-in-itself. The categories of understanding, according to Kant, have their immediate relations to the objects given in sensible-intuitions, but they can never be applied to the thing-in-itself. As distinguished from understanding, reason, for Kant, "is never in immediate relation to an object"<sup>36</sup> In his view, reason has its relation to an object only "through the understanding"<sup>37</sup>

But Hegel does not accept Kant's meanings of the terms understanding and reason. He says, "...it is not really reason but the understanding that holds sway in Kantian philosophy"<sup>38</sup> Since it is the understanding which makes knowledge, for Kant, possible, that is why Hegel says that understanding constitutes the basis for Kantian epistemology. Hegel tries to show that reason has no specific role to play in Kantian epistemology

Hegel, therefore, subjects to a reinterpretation of reason and understanding in accordance with his own philosophical framework. And since his framework is different from that of

35 Ibid.

36 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* · Tr. by N.K. Smith, pp 532-3.

37 Ibid., p 533.

38 Herbert Marcuse *Reason and Revolution* Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. London 1977, p. 48

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Kant, his meanings of reason and understanding are also different. Explaining Hegel's position, Herbert Marcuse says :

"The world is taken as a multitude of determinate things, each of which is demarcated from the other. The concepts that are developed from these beginnings, and the judgements composed of these concepts, denote and deal with isolated things and fixed relations between such things ."<sup>39</sup>

The isolation and limitation of an entity in this way, Hegel calls "finite" because it is governed by the principles of identity and opposition. He states that everything is identical with itself and by virtue of its self-identity, it is opposed to all other things. However, it can be, ". connected and combined with them in many ways, but it never loses its own identity and never becomes something other than itself".<sup>40</sup> Hegel adds, "All that it says about what it knows is just that it is, and its truth contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing."<sup>41</sup> This mode of knowledge is the immediate knowledge where, " .. we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself".<sup>42</sup>

But the isolated things, according to Hegel, have to be combined and connected with the numberless polarities and antithesis, which arises between the individual and the universal, are ". the object of understanding".<sup>43</sup> Thus his concept of understanding, which makes its object the antithesis between the individual and universal, differs from that of Kant which makes it object the synthesis of sensible intuitions. For Hegel the concept of understanding makes its object the antithesis between individual and universal which ". are not, however, the final state of affairs. The world must not remain a complex of fixed disparates. The unity that underlies the antagonisms must be grasped and realized by reason, which has the task of reconciling the opposites and sublating them in a true reality "<sup>44</sup> Therefore, as distinguished from the understand-

39 Ibid , p. 44.

40 Ibid.

41 Hegel *Phenomenology of Spirit* . Tr by A V. Miller . Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 58.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid , p 87

44 Herbert Marcuse *Reason and Revolution*, p. 45

ing, reason is motivated by the need "to restore the totality".<sup>45</sup> Thus in Hegel reason unifies the antithesis between the individual and the universal which is the object of understanding whereas in Kant, it is the unity of apperception which unifies the manifold of sensible intuitions with the categories of understanding

Hegel tries to replace Kantian thing-in-itself by positing "one universal structure of all being. Being was to be a process wherein a thing 'comprehends' or 'grasps' the various states of its existence and draws them into the more or less enduring unity of its 'self', thus actively constituting itself as 'the same' throughout all change. Everything, in other words, exists more or less as a 'subject'. The identical structure of movement that thus runs through the entire realm of being unites the objective and subjective worlds"<sup>46</sup> Unlike Kant for whom objects of knowledge are possible through the thing-in-itself, according to Hegel, an object gets its objectivity from the subject because the real which consciousness actually holds in the endless flux of sensations and perceptions is a universal which cannot be reduced to objects free from the subject. The object, in other words, must be comprehended as a subject, in its relation to its otherness, or as Hegel puts it that object of consciousness is "the externalization of self-consciousness that posits the thinghood (of the object). the object is in part immediate being or, in general, a thing-corresponding to immediate consciousness, in part an othering of itself, its relationship or being-for-another and being-for-itself."<sup>47</sup>

In Hegel's analysis, object is an externalization of the spirit which, "itself as a whole, and the self-differentiated moments within it, falls within the sphere of picture-thinking and in the form of objectivity. The content of this picture-thinking is absolute spirit; and all that now remains to be done is to supersede this mere form, or rather, since this

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>47</sup> Hegel: *Phenomenology of Spirit* Tr. by A. V. Miller, pp. 479-80.

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belongs to consciousness as such, its truth must already have yielded itself in the shape of consciousness”<sup>48</sup>

On this basis, Hegel rejects Kant's unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself and maintains that all being is realized by reason and all becoming is a development of reason, and if all that is real is a manifestation of reason and each thing is a stage or modification of reason ; then reason and the real are identical. In Hegel, “reason or the idea is not merely a demand, a longed for ideal but a world-power which accomplishes its own realization .The rational is real and the real is rational”<sup>49</sup>

Hegel, thus, rejects the unknown and unknowable Kantian thing-in-itself by regarding that to be and to be known are one and the same thing. On this basis, he demonstrates that our knowledge of a thing is not only as it appears to us, but also as it is in-itself.

There are, however, certain shortcomings in Hegel's analysis of Kant's thing-in-itself. The basic shortcoming lies in his approach from an absolute idealist standpoint which, in itself, is an assumption of the existence of matter dependent on consciousness. He is opposed to thing-in-itself precisely because an ontological existence of matter independent of consciousness cannot be conceived within his idealism. Therefore, he attempts to identify ontology with epistemology, being with thought, or as he puts it the real is rational and the rational is real.

But Kant's thing-in-itself, as the ground and cause of appearances and yet as independent of mind, provides the basis of human cognition better than Hegel's objects which are an externalization of the spirit. It is in this context that Kant's thing-in-itself, according to Lenin, has to be justified. But Lenin rejects the unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself and regards it as essentially cognizable. This conception is based on man's centuries of practical and cognitive activities, forms of constant renovation and transformation of the world through which the unknown thing in-itself becomes the known thing-for-us.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid , p. 479.

<sup>49</sup> Richard Falkenberg *History of Modern Philosophy* Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1977, p. 490

To sum up, the three concepts namely—noumenon, thing-in-itself and phenomenon constitute the totality of Kant's ontology. The concept of noumenon constitutes the idealist aspect of Kant's ontology, whereas the concept of thing-in-itself presents its materialist aspect. The concept of phenomenon constitutes the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge. In Kant's analysis, human cognition is confined to the extent a thing can be given in sensible intuition and is determined by the categories. But human cognition can never penetrate into the noumenon and the thing-in-itself because they cannot be cognized by sensible intuitions. Kant thus prepares a border of cognition between what is cognizable in-principle and what is incognizable.

On the basis of what is cognizable in principle and what is incognizable, the epistemological problems in Kant arise. He expresses those problems in terms of possibility, validity and limit of human cognition. His analysis of epistemology is based on his concepts of space and time and the categories which constitute the sources of human cognition.

## Kant's Position on Space and Time

While attempting to examine Kant's position on space and time in the context of his epistemology, it is necessary to clarify his meanings of analytic, a priori and synthetic propositions. It is also necessary to bring out the implications of his concept of space and time, and his concept of phenomenon and thing-in-itself. In order to understand the significance of space and time in human cognition, it is necessary to examine Kant's views on space and time in the context of its similarities as well as differences with Newton (1642-1727), Locke and Leibniz (1646-1716) on the one hand, and Engels, Lenin and Einstein (1874-1955) on the other.

Kant discusses his concepts of space and time in the section "Transcendental Aesthetic", by which he means, "the science of all principles of a priori sensibility.."<sup>1</sup> According to Kant, "Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions..."<sup>2</sup> Sensibility is the "capacity [receptivity] for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects..."<sup>3</sup> Thus, sensibility, takes place

1 Kant : *Critique of Pure Reason* . Tr. by N.K. Smith, p. 66.

2 Ibid., p. 65.

3 Ibid.

when an object affects human beings. And it is sensibility that gives rise to intuitions to which "all thought as a means is directed"<sup>4</sup> For Kant human thought can relate to an object only through intuition which is possible only in so far as an object affects the human being and thus produces sensibility. An intuition is that through which human thought is in "immediate relation"<sup>5</sup> to an object. But an intuition is possible only in so far as an object affects the human being and thereby produces sensibility. Therefore intuitions are dependent on sensibility.

But there is a difference between these two. Intuition is that to which thought immediately relates, while sensibility is that which immediately relates to an object which affects a human being. Thus intuitions are yielded by sensibility. Kant states that when thought immediately relates to intuitions, it (thought) ultimately relates to sensibility, because, "in no other way can an object be given to us"<sup>6</sup>

Kant holds that intuitions, which are yielded by sensibility can be regarded as sensible intuitions and there must be a form in which they "can be posited and ordered"<sup>7</sup> The form in which a manifold of sensible intuition is posited and ordered ". must be found in the mind a priori."<sup>8</sup> But the form itself cannot be derived from the sensible intuition, and must, therefore, be a priori. Kant says, ". there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles of a priori knowledge, namely, space and time".<sup>9</sup>

Thus, for Kant, space and time are forms of sensible intuition in which the manifold of sensible intuition can be posited and ordered. Hence space and time cannot be derived from sensible intuitions and must be regarded as a priori. Therefore in the transcendental aesthetic, Kant tries to show that space and time are a priori and that all the manifold of sensible

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid, p. 66.

8 Ibid

9 Ibid, p. 67.

intuitions can be posited and ordered in the form of space and time. And when Kant calls transcendental aesthetic as principles of a priori sensibility, he means by it the a priori forms of sensible intuitions

Before discussing Kant's specific position on space and time as forms of sensible intuition, it is necessary to explain his meaning of analytic, a priori, and synthetic propositions.

In the context of the difference between analytic and synthetic propositions, Kant writes, "In all judgements in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (I take into consideration affirmative judgements only, the subsequent application to negative judgements being easily made), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A, or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgement analytic, in the other synthetic"<sup>10</sup>

In the analytic judgements "...the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity..."<sup>11</sup> whereas in the synthetic judgements this connection is thought without identity. For instance, 'All bodies are extended' is an analytic judgement because here the concept of the predicate, i.e. 'extension', is already contained in the concept of the subject, i.e. bodies. But in the judgement 'All bodies are heavy', the predicate is something quite different from anything that can be thought in the mere concept of body in general. Therefore the addition of such a predicate yields a synthetic judgement.

Analytic judgements, according to Kant, are universal and necessary and they cannot be derived from experience, whereas synthetic judgements are contingent and probable because in them "...the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate 'weight' with the concept 'body'.. rests upon experience. While one concept is not contained in the other, they yet belong to one another, though only contingently."<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p 48.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p 50.



Like analytic judgements, "necessity and strict universality are ..sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable from one another"<sup>13</sup> A priori judgements, like the analytic judgements, cannot be derived from experience and thus they are different from synthetic judgements. But the a priori judgements differ from the analytic judgements in the sense that in the latter the connection between the subject and the predicate is conceived in terms of containedness, identity, but it is not so in the case of the former Kant explains a priori judgements by giving an example—"Every event must have a cause" In this the concept of subject, i.e. the event, is not identical with the concept of predicate, i.e. the cause, but the concept of a cause contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule. The concept of cause would lose universality and necessity, if it is derived from a repeated association of that which happens with that which precedes and from a custom of connecting representations as Hume has done. The concept of cause is universal and necessary precisely because it is not derived from experience, and universality and necessity indicate "a special source of knowledge, namely—a faculty of a priori knowledge"<sup>14</sup> And the concept of cause "has its seat in our faculty of a priori knowledge"<sup>15</sup>

In the faculty of a priori concepts Kant includes space and time which are regarded by him as the forms of intuition in which the manifold of sensible intuitions are posited and ordered. By virtue of being a priori, the forms of intuition, i.e. space and time, can never be derived from sensible intuitions

In the transcendental aesthetic, Kant discusses space and time under two heads—metaphysical and transcendental. In the metaphysical exposition he tries to show that space and time are a priori and they cannot be derived from sensible intuitions. In the transcendental exposition he states that though space and time cannot be derived from sensible intuition, yet every

13 Ibid , p 44.

14 Ibid

15 Ibid , p. 45.

manifold of sensible intuition has to be received by the mind in the form of space and time. The connection and difference between metaphysical and transcendental expositions consist in the fact that while the former states that space and time are a priori and are not derived from sensible intuition, the latter states that though space and time are not derived from sensible intuition yet sensible intuitions have to be received in the form of space and time.

In the metaphysical exposition of space and time, Kant tries to "exhibit the concept as given a priori".<sup>16</sup> Regarding metaphysical knowledge, he writes, "...as regards the sources of metaphysical knowledge, it lies in the very concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (which comprise not only its fundamental propositions but also its fundamental concepts) must never be taken from experience; for it is not to be physical but metaphysical knowledge, i.e. lying beyond experience".<sup>17</sup> Metaphysical knowledge, thus can never be derived from sensible intuitions which are empirical. He states, "Metaphysics is thus knowledge a priori, or out of pure understanding and pure reason".<sup>18</sup> In the metaphysical exposition of the concepts of space and time, Kant states that these concepts cannot be derived from sensible intuition and must, therefore, be a priori. He discusses space and time separately and gives four arguments in favour of the concept of space and five arguments in favour of the concept of time in order to prove them a priori.

First argument of the concept of space: "space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences".<sup>19</sup> By outer experiences, he means, "...a property of our mind",<sup>20</sup> through which, "we represent to ourselves objects as outside us."<sup>21</sup> Representation is regarded by Kant as a kind

16 Ibid, p. 68.

17 Kant *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to present itself as a Science*. Tr. by Peter G. Lucas. Manchester University Press, Oxford, 1953, p. 15.

18 Ibid.

19 Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason*. Tr. by N.K. Smith. p. 68.

20 Ibid., p. 67.

21 Ibid.

of cognitive process through which objects are regarded as outside us. He states that sensations arise, when objects, which are outside us, act on our senses. In order to regard different representations, "as in different places",<sup>22</sup> according to Kant, "The representation of space must be presupposed"<sup>23</sup> It follows that the "representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer appearances"<sup>24</sup> Kant holds that the representations of objects in different sensations are possible only by presupposing the concept of space, therefore, "this outer experience is itself possible at all through that presupposition"<sup>25</sup> And since the concept of space is presupposed by the outer experience, so space cannot be derived from outer experience and must, therefore, be regarded as a priori

Second argument : "We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of object".<sup>26</sup> He argues that (it is not possible to have a representation of an object without space, though it is possible to conceive of space without the representation of any object. Space must, therefore, be "regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent upon them"<sup>27</sup> Since space can exist without any representation whereas no representation is possible without space, therefore the concept of space is regarded by Kant as a priori

Third argument : "...We can present to ourselves only one space, and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space".<sup>28</sup> He illustrates this position by the example of a proposition, "In a triangle two sides together are greater than the third side". In this it is possible to conceive the two sides together as greater than the third side, only if there is only one space, in which the greater

22 Ibid , p 68

23 Ibid

24 Ibid

25 Ibid

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid , p 69.

and the smaller parts of the triangle can be represented. Kant states that the concept of one space cannot be derived from different spatial representations of objects. Therefore the concept of one space must be “.. a priori, with apodeictic certainty”<sup>29</sup>

Fourth argument : “space is represented as an infinite given magnitude”<sup>30</sup> This argument is based on the third argument where he maintains that we can conceive of only one space and different spatial representations are the different parts of one space. The concept of one space is regarded by Kant as infinite in the fourth argument. He states that the concept of one space contains “within itself”<sup>31</sup> an “infinite number of representations”.<sup>32</sup> Therefore the concept of one space, containing an infinite number of representations within itself, cannot be derived from sensible intuition and must, therefore, be a priori.

In the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time, Kant gives the following arguments which are similar to the arguments given in favour of the concept of space.

First argument : “Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience”.<sup>33</sup> Hence the concept of time must be presupposed in order to have the representation of succession and duration of an object. “Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively)”<sup>34</sup> Therefore the concept of time must be regarded as a priori, because it is presupposed for the representation of succession and duration of objects.

Second argument : “We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearance”<sup>35</sup> He states that the representation of coexistence and succession of an object is possible only in time, though it is possible to conceive time without any representation.)

29 Ibid

30 Ibid

31 Ibid , p. 70.

32 Ibid

33 Ibid , p 74.

34 Ibid

35 Ibid , p 75.

In this context, Kant says, "Appearances may, one and all, vanish, but time (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot itself be removed"<sup>36</sup> It is possible to conceive that the representation of succession and coexistence of an object can vanish, but it is impossible to conceive that time will also be removed along with those representations. Therefore, the concept of time must be regarded as a priori<sup>37</sup>

Third argument : The concept of "time" has "only one dimension",<sup>38</sup> i.e. "one after another". Different temporal representations of succession of objects are conceived in one dimension of time. This concept cannot be derived from sensible intuition and must, therefore, be regarded as a priori.

Fourth argument : "Different times are but parts of one and the same time."<sup>39</sup> Kant holds that the different representations of coexistence and succession of objects are possible only in one time. Such a concept can never be derived from the representation of succession and coexistence of objects and must, therefore, be regarded as a priori.

Fifth argument : "The original representation, time, must therefore, be given as unlimited"<sup>40</sup> This argument is based on the previous argument where Kant conceives only one time and states that the different representations of coexistence and succession of objects can be regarded as parts of one and the same time. Here the concept of one time is regarded as unlimited, so that an infinite number of the representations of succession and coexistence of objects can be conceived. The concept of time, as unlimited, according to Kant, cannot be derived from sensible intuition and must, therefore, be regarded as a priori.

Thus, in the metaphysical exposition of space and time, Kant claims to prove that space and time cannot be derived from sensible intuition and must, therefore, be regarded as a priori. Space and time are the presuppositions of the repre-

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

sentation of any object and they must be regarded as the condition for the possibility of any representation. According to Kant, we can conceive of only one space and time and different representations are only parts of the one space and time which are infinite and unlimited.

Next, Kant discusses the transcendental exposition of space and time and tries to show that every manifold of sensible intuition has to be received in the form of space and time so that, "a priori synthetic knowledge can be understood"<sup>41</sup> In this exposition Kant tries to prove that our knowledge in geometry and physics is possible only regarding space and time as synthetic a priori.

It may be pointed out that in the case of the metaphysical exposition of space and time, Kant gives similar arguments to prove them as a priori, but in the transcendental exposition there is no such similarity. This is so because he tries to prove the concept of space as synthetic a priori by giving an example from geometry, and the concept of time as synthetic a priori by giving an example from physics. These two different examples make space and time as synthetic a priori in two different ways.

According to Kant, "Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori"<sup>42</sup> The proposition, "The sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles", is a synthetic proposition because in order to find a triangle and to find out the sum of its three angles as equal to two right angles, we have to take the aid of the sensible intuition. Therefore he regards the proposition as synthetic. At the same time, this proposition expresses necessity and universality which can never be derived from sensible intuition. Therefore, the proposition can also be regarded as a priori. Kant, thus, holds that space, to which geometrical propositions relate, must be a priori as well as synthetic. The a priori synthetic character of geometrical propositions, according to Kant, are possible only on the supposition of space as synthetic a priori.

The transcendental exposition of the concept of time is

41 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

42 *Ibid.*

discussed by Kant in physics with, " . the concept of alteration and with it the concept of motion . ." <sup>43</sup> He states that the concept of time has only one dimension, i e "one after another" <sup>44</sup>, i e. in succession. But we can have the representation of alteration of an object only by the aid of sensible intuition. At the same time, the dimension of time also expresses apodeictic certainty which can never be derived from sensible intuition and must, therefore, be a priori. Therefore the representation of alteration of objects is possible only through the concept of motion. Motion, for Kant, is a concept through which the alteration of objects is represented : "Motion presupposes the perception of something movable" <sup>45</sup> But every alteration is possible only in the concept of time which itself does not move . "Time itself does not alter, but only something which is in time." <sup>46</sup> Therefore, the concept of time explains the possibility of "a priori synthetic knowledge which is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion. ." <sup>47</sup>

Kant, in this way, tries to prove that our knowledge in physics or geometry is possible as synthetic a priori only by regarding the concept of space and time as synthetic a priori. Kant states that the metaphysical exposition proves the concepts of space and time as a priori and transcendental exposition proves them as synthetic. And both the arguments together prove the concepts of space and time as a priori synthetic. Kant, however, does not show how all the arguments of the metaphysical exposition are mutually interdependent on the one hand , and on the other hand, how they are related to the arguments of the transcendental exposition. But one may bring out their interrelations because all the arguments in the metaphysical exposition seem to be interrelated and also related to transcendental exposition of the concepts of space and time.

Kant's fundamental contention, in the metaphysical and the transcendental expositions, has been that the concepts of space

43 Ibid , p. 76.

44 Ibid

45 Ibid , p. 82

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid , p. 76

and time cannot be derived from sensible intuition and that every manifold of sensible intuition has to be received in the form of space and time. On this basis, the concepts of space and time are independent of sensible intuition, while every manifold of sensible intuition is dependent on space and time. Therefore, in the first argument of the metaphysical exposition, Kant holds that the concepts of space and time must be presupposed for the possibility of the sensible intuition. In other words, a manifold of sensible intuition can be received in the form of space and time only by presupposing the concepts of space and time. In this way, the first argument of the metaphysical exposition is related to the transcendental exposition.

It is implied in the first argument of the metaphysical exposition that space and time can be conceived without any sensible intuition. Therefore, in the second argument Kant holds that space and time can be conceived without the manifold of sensible intuition, but no sensible intuition, is possible without space and time. This argument is also related with the transcendental exposition because the concepts of space and time are regarded as the condition for the possibility of sensible intuition.

It is further implied in the first and second arguments of the metaphysical exposition that the concepts of space and time cannot differ in accordance with the differences in the manifold of sensible intuitions, because the concepts of space and time do not depend on sensible intuitions. Therefore in the third argument, Kant holds that there must be one space and one time in which different manifolds of sensible intuitions can be posited. So a manifold of sensible intuition differs from other manifold of sensible intuitions only in accordance with the affection of different objects. But different sensible intuitions can be ordered in the form of one space and time which is regarded by Kant as infinite in the fourth argument. The third and fourth arguments are also related with the transcendental exposition because the propositions of geometry, with their greater and smaller parts, are possible only by presupposing one infinite space as their condition and different sensible intuitions of alterations are possible only by presupposing one unlimited



time, as their condition. In this way all the arguments of metaphysical exposition are related with one another and also with the arguments of the transcendental exposition

According to Kant, every object, in so far as it can be given in the manifold of sensible intuition, is subject to space and time. He therefore, regards space and time as empirically real. Kant asserts the empirical reality of the concept of space as "regards all possible outer experiences",<sup>48</sup> and the empirical reality of the concept of time, that is, "its objective validity in respect of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses".<sup>49</sup> At the same time, he states that space and time are transcendently ideal, because they do not exist independent of the human mind. But the concepts of space and time cannot be regarded as absolute realities and can never be applied to the things-in-themselves. Kant says, ". we can indeed say that space comprehends all things that appear to us as external, but not all things in themselves by whatever subject they are intuited .."<sup>50</sup> Similarly about the concept of time, Kant says, ". we deny to time all claims of absolute reality, that is to say, we deny that it belongs to things absolutely, as their condition or property, independently of any reference to the form of our sensible intuition, properties that belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through the senses"<sup>51</sup> He maintains that things-in-themselves are the ground and cause of appearances, but space and time can never be applied to things-in-themselves. Space and time can be applied to things only in so far as they can be given in sensible intuitions.

Now we will analyse Kant's position on space and time in the context of the similarities and dissimilarities with the concepts of Newton, Locke and Leibniz. Kant's position in the metaphysical exposition of space and time is in certain respects similar and in certain respects dissimilar to Newton's views on them. Kant agrees with Newton who maintains that space and time are independent from material things and events while

48 Ibid, p 72

49 Ibid., p 77

50 Ibid, p 72.

51 Ibid., p 78.

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material things and events for their existence depend on them," C D Broad, explaining Newton's position, says ·

"The first and fundamental point is that space is logically prior to matter, and time is logically prior to events or processes. There could not have been matter unless there had been space for it to occupy and to rest or move in and Time for it to endure through. There could not have been events or processes unless there had been Time in which they have their dates and their durations. But there would have been space... even if there had never been any matter, and there would have been Time even if there had never been any events or processes" <sup>52</sup>

This view of Newton can be related with that of Kant who maintains in the same way that sensible intuition can represent an object only if space and time must be presupposed. For Kant, it is possible to conceive space and time without any representation of an object, but it is impossible to have representation of objects without space and time. Therefore, for Kant as well as for Newton, space and time are prior to any object or any event.

Further, according to Newton, "strictly space is indivisible. One can indeed talk of parts of space, i.e. different regions actually or in imagination marked out of entertaining certain material objects or by being traced in pencil or ink. But parts of space are in principle inseparable."<sup>53</sup> Newton states that we can talk of one "infinite"<sup>54</sup> space and "the same is true of Time, it had no beginning and will have no end" <sup>55</sup> Newton, thus, maintains that there are absolute space and absolute time, which are, "... independent of us, that even if there were no perceivers, there would still be space and time".<sup>56</sup>

<sup>52</sup> C D Broad *Leibniz's Last Controversy with the Newtonians ; Leibniz - Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science*, ed by R S Woolhouse, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp 158-9

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p. 159.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 160.

<sup>56</sup> T E. Wilkerson *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, A Commentary for Students* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, p. 37

Kant, however, differs from Newton's concepts of absolute space and absolute time independent of perceivers and maintains that space and time are in no sense independent of perceivers and, "if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay, space and time themselves would vanish".<sup>57</sup> Kant, in this way, holds that space and time are "in us" "forms of our sensible intuition".

Locke accepts Newton's concept of absolute space, and he tries to justify it through his (Locke's) concept of a vacuum on the basis that "it is evident that the space that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body will still remain and be a space without body"<sup>58</sup> For Locke the material substance has the primary qualities such as solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. Out of these primary qualities only extension can give rise to the "idea of space"<sup>59</sup> He holds that every body has extension and therefore it occupies space. Locke says, "there is no necessary connexion between space and solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other",<sup>60</sup> and it is possible to form an idea of extension without solidity. The idea of space without bodies is regarded by Locke as vacuum. "Vacuum. signified space without body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible."<sup>61</sup>

Through his concept of a vacuum, Locke tries to justify Newton's concept of absolute space. Just as for Newton it is possible to conceive space without any object, similarly for Locke it is possible to conceive a vacuum without bodies. Both these concepts are independent of the perceiver.

But Kant differs from Newton and Locke. His concept of space is the form which we project upon the objects and is dependent on the perceiver. Another difference is that for Kant space is a priori, but for Locke, it is derived from experience.

57 Kant : *Critique of Pure Reason* Tr by N K Smith, p 82.

58 Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p 98.

59 Ibid , p 89.

60 Ibid , p 88.

61 Ibid.

So far as the concept of time is concerned, Locke maintains that there must be eternity in which the succession and duration can be conceived. He says, "It is evident, to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession; and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration"<sup>62</sup>

Thus his ideas of succession and duration are derived from reflection on the succession and duration of a train of ideas, which are constantly succeeding one another. Locke holds that we can have "no perception of duration",<sup>63</sup> but we can have reflection on the ideas which have some duration and the same is true of succession. And since all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection, they can be regarded as the original source of the ideas of succession and duration and "...we shall find that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas"<sup>64</sup> Locke maintains that we have the idea of such an eternal being, i.e. God, and reflection on this idea furnishes us with the idea of eternity. He, thus, differs from Newton's concept of absolute time.

But Kant differs from both Newton and Locke. On the one hand, he does not accept Newton's concept of absolute time as independent of the human mind. On the other hand, he differs from Locke who derives the concept of eternity from the reflection on the idea of an eternal being, i.e. God. Kant holds that the concept of time is dependent on the human mind and is applicable to the representation of coexistence and succession of an object in so far as it can be given in sensible intuition.

But Leibniz is opposed to Newton's concept of absolute

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

space and absolute time. The ultimate reality for him is the individual substance known as monad, which "...is nothing but a simple substance which enters into compounds, simple, that is to say, without parts".<sup>65</sup> Every monad is distinct and separate, because "Monads have no windows, by which anything could come in or go out"<sup>66</sup> These monads are regarded by Leibniz as "the true atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things"<sup>67</sup> When various monads are put together, they make a compound substance, which, "...is nothing but a collection of simples".<sup>68</sup> For example human body is a collection of monads, that is to say, it is a compound substance. Leibniz maintains that there are infinite substances independent of one another. Thus ontologically he is a pluralist. At the same time, he holds that every substance is created by God and is dependent on God. Therefore Leibniz is an objective idealist.

But space and time, according to Leibniz, "...are not individual substances".<sup>69</sup> He defines space and time by reference to the actual existence and change of monads "...space is nothing but an arrangement of bodies, and time is nothing but an order of changes". Leibniz holds that space and time have no independent existence outside the existence and change of monads because, "space and time are nothing but the order of real existences"<sup>70</sup> Therefore he is opposed to Newton's concept that space and time can be conceived without objects and events.

But Kant's views are different from those of Leibniz's because his concepts of space and time are possible even if there are no representations of objects and events. Thus he differs from Leibniz's concept that "space and time cannot exist outside the existence and change of monads"<sup>71</sup>

65 Leibniz *Philosophical Writings* Tr by Mang Morris, London, J M Dent and Sons Ltd, New York, E P Dutton and Co Inc 1961, p. 3

66 Ibid

67 Ibid

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid, Introduction, p xxii.

70 Ibid, p xxiii

71 Ibid.

But Kant's concepts are opposed by Engels and Lenin who recognize, "... existence of objective reality, i.e. matter in motion, independently of our mind." <sup>72</sup>, i.e. "... the objective reality of space and time." <sup>73</sup>

Engels and Lenin maintain that every material entity is dialectically interconnected and interdependent. Engels as quoted by Lenin says "There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion 'cannot move otherwise than in space and time'". <sup>74</sup> Engels further says, "the basic forms of all being are space and time, being out of time is as gross an absurdity as being out of space" <sup>75</sup> Lenin, in conformity with Engels, says, "Just as things or bodies are not mere phenomena, not complexes of sensations, but objective realities acting on our senses, so space and time are not mere forms of phenomena, but objectively real forms of being". <sup>76</sup> Engels and Lenin, in this way, maintain that space and time must be regarded as objective and independent of the human mind. Therefore, they refute Kant's concept of them as mind dependent.

Space and time as conceived in the theory of relativity propounded by Einstein "... is a plenum in the sense that it is the ubiquitous matricial field and as such it is obviously a continuum. At the same time, it is a system of relations between continuous events and is nothing at all apart from them." <sup>77</sup> His theory of relativity is based on the refutation of Newton's views of absolute space and absolute time. He rejects Newton's concept that space and time can have an independent existence apart from their relations with material things and events. By rejecting Newton's concept, he also rejects Kant's concept that the representations of things presuppose space and time though they can be conceived without any representations of things.

<sup>72</sup> Lenin *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 158

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> F. Engels *Anti-Dühring*, Progress Publishers Moscow, 1978, p. 69

<sup>76</sup> V.I. Lenin *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 158

<sup>77</sup> Errol E. Harris *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1965, p. 471

Space and time, for Einstein, cannot exist apart from their relations with material things and events. According to him, every material thing is in a continuous change, so space and time must be regarded as a continuum.

For Einstein, space and time are in unity, and in this context Harris says, "space-time is four dimensional because the diversification of space—the specification of distance is a temporal process. Measurement of length involves motion and motion is temporal as well as spatial. The diversity of space is thus consequent upon motion, or its infusion with time, and instantaneous coexistence of its parts is an impossibility, for it would eliminate measurement and contradict their diversity, which (for space) is synonymous with distance. In space-time, therefore, time is the diversifying factor and it is apparent that the very existence of diversity involves time."<sup>78</sup>

According to Einstein, space, apart from length, breadth and height, has one more dimension and that is time. The specification of distances and every change in material things involves both spatial and temporal process. He, therefore, rejects Newton's position that changes in material things involve only temporal processes and exclude spatial processes. Though he does not refer to Kant, yet the rejection of Newton's position implies the rejection of Kant's position, because both of them hold similar views on this. He points out that every alteration and succession involves both spatial and temporal processes and space-time also change in accordance with the changes in material things because space time can never be regarded as outside their relations with material things and events.

Thus taking Einstein's position on space and time to be scientifically valid, it may be said that Kant's concepts of space and time as "a priori forms of sensible intuitions" are opposed to the real scientific concept. Science maintains that space and time are forms of the objectively existing material things and events. They have no existence apart from their relations with material things and events. A P Sheptulin says, "space and time are not only connected with matter, but are also dependent on it; they are determined by the nature of material

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entities and the form of motion inherent in them".<sup>79</sup> On this basis it can be concluded that Kant's position is inconsistent with the scientific viewpoint because he regards space and time as (i) existing independently of material things and events given in sensible intuition, and (ii) existing dependent on human mind in general.

To sum up, according to Kant, when the manifold of sensible intuitions are synthesized in the form of space and time, then they are brought to the faculty of understanding, which by virtue of its categories, determines the manifold of sensible intuitions into the categories of unity, reality, cause-effect, etc. For Kant, the sensible intuitions synthesized in the form of space and time, become the objects of knowledge. These intuitions are regarded by Kant as blind without the categories. Blindness of sensible intuitions means their meaninglessness. In order to give them meaning, they have to be determined by the categories.

<sup>79</sup> A. P. Sheptulin: *Marxist-Leninist Philosophy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, pp. 110-1



## An Analysis and Examination of Categories in Kant's Epistemology

What, then, is the origin and role of categories in Kant's epistemology. They are the very centre of his quest. They are the transcendental conditions through which understanding seeks to satisfy its thrust to systematic unity. The categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of the "logical employment of understanding". In the context, the similarities and dissimilarities of his position with the epistemological positions of Aristotle, Descartes and Hume on the one hand and that of Marx and Lenin on the other have to be discussed.

Before analyzing Kant's position on categories, we should examine the views of Aristotle (384-322 BC), who was the first to use the term in philosophy.

Aristotle maintains that categories are the fundamental concepts of thought and at the same time they are the basic features of objective reality. Hence it is impossible to think of anything as real and existent except as subsumed under one or more of the categories. He enumerates ten such categories which are as follows : substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle *Ethics*, by J.A.K. Thomson, Penguin Books, 1981, p. 353.

Aristotle regards these ten categories as the fundamental concepts which constitute the basic features of material things. However, he maintains that the category of substance is the most important one and the others have their importance only in so far as they can be predicated to it, because " . things are called good in as many senses as they are said to exist , for they are so called in the category of substance. ."<sup>2</sup> By the category of substance, Aristotle means, "The simple bodies (earth, fire, water and all such things), and bodies generally and the things composed of them—living creatures as well as the stars and their parts. All these are called 'substance' because they are not predicated of a subject while everything else is predicated of them "<sup>3</sup>

Aristotle also states that substance is primarily and essentially individual. The classification of individuals and the definition of their essential and distinctive properties may be called substances, which he calls as universals. Thus, in every sensible substance there are two aspects, "On the one hand, there is Form, which makes it the kind of particular it is , on the other hand , there is matter, which makes it particular and concrete, and individuates it from all other particular and concrete objects of its kind "<sup>4</sup> However these two aspects cannot be separated from each other. Aristotle states that categories provide both the content and the form of the knowledge of every sensible substance. For instance, "Gold is yellow, heavy, soft etc " in this proposition neither gold can exist stripped of its predicates, nor can the predicates exist apart from their subject, i.e. gold. Thus, for Aristotle neither absolutely matterless form nor absolutely formless matter can ever be given in any sensible substance.

But Kant is opposed to Aristotle's views on categories. Criticizing Aristotelean categories, he says, "He merely picked them up as they came in his way."<sup>5</sup> The difference between

2 Ibid,

3 Aristotle *Metaphysics* : Tr. by John Warrington ; J M. Dent and Sons Ltd, London, 1956, p. 18.

4 Fuller and McMurrin *A History of Philosophy* ; Oxford and IBH Publishing Co , New Delhi, 1976, p 176.

5 Kant : *Critique of Pure Reason*, Tr. p. 114

the two regarding the categories arise out of their fundamental philosophical positions. Whereas for Aristotle, an object is the amalgamation of form and content, and is independent of the human mind ; for Kant, an object is synthetic a priori in which the a priori aspects, i.e. the forms, cannot exist independent of the human mind but they can exist independent of the synthetic aspects which constitute the content. On this basis, Kant draws a distinction between form and content and this leads to his differences with Aristotle's categories. Kant differs regarding the origin of the categories, because there "are to be found in it some modes of pure sensibility, and an empirical concept, none of which has any place in a table of concepts that trace their origin to the understanding"<sup>6</sup> For Kant categories are the "original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself a priori"<sup>7</sup> He also differs from Aristotle's views on space (place) and time which the latter regards as categories, whereas for Kant they are forms of sensible intuition. Another difference is that whereas Aristotle expounds ten categories, Kant expounds twelve.

At the same time, Kant agrees with Aristotle that the knowledge of an object is possible only through the categories. He also retains some of the categories already enumerated by Aristotle such as substance, quality, quantity, relation, position and state. But whereas in Aristotle, categories provide both the form and content, in Kant they can provide only the form, and the content is given by the sensible-intuitions. For, "...thoughts without contents are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind".<sup>8</sup> The blindness of sensible-intuitions means their meaninglessness. In order to give them meaning, they have to be determined by the categories. Thus, "Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of mind ; the first is the capacity of receiving the representations, the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations".<sup>9</sup>

A representation, according to Kant, is that through which

6 Ibid

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid , p. 93.

9 Ibid , p. 92.

an object is given to us and it is possible when the thing-in-itself acts on our senses and thus produces the sensible intuitions. And the power of the mind of knowing the representations is for him the categories. In his analysis, categories and sensible intuitions, which together constitute the knowledge of an object, cannot interchange their functions. "The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing" <sup>10</sup>

As different from Aristotle, Kant tries to provide a systematic analysis of the categories. And he does so by distinguishing the rules of sensibility which presents the objects of knowledge, from the "rules of the understanding in general, that is, logic," <sup>11</sup> which furnishes the means; i.e., the categories through which an object is known.

Kant's views on the rules of sensibility, that is to say transcendental aesthetic, have been discussed earlier. Now we shall dwell upon his views on logic through which he furnishes the means of knowledge, i.e. the categories.

Kant regards logic in a twofold manner 'either as logic of the general or as logic of the special employment of the understanding' <sup>12</sup>. The logic of the general "contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment whatsoever of the understanding" <sup>13</sup>. Therefore it treats "of understanding without any regard to difference in the object to which the understanding may be directed" <sup>14</sup>.

On the other hand, the logic of the special employment of the understanding is regarded as particular logic. It deals with rules of understanding concerning a particular class of objects. The particular logic differs from the general logic in the sense that the former is valid to the extent of a particular class of object while the latter is valid universally.

Kant regards understanding as a "faculty of judgement" <sup>15</sup>. Judgement is the function of understanding. But func-

10 Ibid., p. 93.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 106

tion, he means "... the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation"<sup>16</sup> Every judgement consists of concepts and "the only use which understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them".<sup>17</sup> Consequently, "The knowledge yielded by understanding, must therefore be by means of concepts ..."<sup>18</sup> The concepts, which are used in a judgement, can be used in various other representations. For example, in the judgement, "All men are mortal", the concept of mortal can be applied to various other representations, like—cows, horses, etc. But it is used here for a particular class, men, and therefore the concept of mortal immediately relates to the representation men. Kant says, "In every judgement there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object".<sup>19</sup> He expounds twelve kinds of judgements and relates them with the corresponding concepts.

However, a judgement is possible only by means of a concept. Therefore concepts are logically prior to the judgements. But Kant, in his analysis, states that concepts are deduced from the judgements. He, in this way, regards judgements as prior to the concepts, though necessarily connected with them.

Kant divides all kinds of judgements into four main heads—quantity, quality, relation and modality, but deals with them separately and does not show any interrelation. Each head contains three subdivisions which are interrelated.

Under quantity, the judgement is universal, particular or singular "All men are mortal" is a universal judgement, because the concept of the subject is universally applicable to the concept of the predicate. In every universal judgement a concept of unity is involved. He deduces the concept of unity from the proposition "All S are P".

"Some mortal beings are men" is a particular judgement

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

because the concept of the subject is not universally applicable to the concept of the predicate. In a particular judgement a concept of plurality is involved. He deduces a concept of plurality from the proposition "Some S are P".

"Socrates is mortal" is a singular judgement, because the concept of subject is an individual being. In a singular judgement a concept of totality is involved because the concept of the subject is in totality with the concept of the predicate. He deduces the concept of totality from the proposition "S is P".

In this way, he deduces the concepts of unity, plurality and totality from the judgements which are universal, particular and singular respectively. He regards the concepts of the judgements of quantity as mutually interrelated because "totality is just plurality considered as unity".<sup>20</sup>

Under quality, the judgement is either affirmative, negative or infinite. "All men are mortal" is an affirmative judgement because the concept of subject has a positive predicate. In an affirmative judgement a concept of reality is involved. Kant deduces the concept of reality from the judgement in which the concept of subject has a positive predicate.

"Some mortal beings are not men", is a negative judgement because in it the concept of the subject excludes the concept of the predicate. Kant deduces the concept of negation from a negative judgement.

"Hydrogen is not green", is an infinite judgement because in it one might be considering two alternatives — (i) hydrogen gas has some colour other than green, (ii) that hydrogen gas has no colour at all. Therefore, this judgement may include both positive and negative predicates. Kant states that the concept of limitation is involved in the judgement which is infinite because it includes both reality and negation.

In this way, Kant deduces the concepts of reality, negation and limitation from the judgements which are affirmative, negative and infinite respectively. These concepts are mutually inter-

related because, "... limitation is simply reality combined with negation ..."<sup>21</sup>

According to Kant, the relation in a judgement can be of three kinds—categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive. Thus "Socrates must be mortal", is a categorical judgement. Every proposition where "S must be P" is maintained, is regarded by Kant as a categorical judgement. Therefore the concept of inherence and subsistence is involved in every categorical judgement because the concept of the subject is inherent and subsistent in the concept of the predicate.

"If there is a perfect justice, the obstinately wicked are punished", is a hypothetical judgement, because it "contains the relation of two propositions ."<sup>22</sup> namely, "There is a perfect justice" and, "The obstinately wicked are punished". In a hypothetical judgement, the truth of the "judgement remains undetermined"<sup>23</sup> But the second proposition depends on the first proposition. Kant holds that the concept of causality and dependence is involved in every hypothetical judgement; because the first proposition is regarded as the cause of the second and the second proposition is regarded as dependent on the first.

"The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through an external cause", is a disjunctive judgement because "each of these propositions occupies a part of the sphere of the possible knowledge concerning the existence of a world in general; all of them together occupy the whole sphere".<sup>24</sup> Kant states that in a disjunctive judgement, we assert either two or more than two propositions which are mutually exclusive but jointly they give the complete knowledge. Therefore the concept of community is involved in every disjunctive judgement because, "There is, therefore, in a disjunctive judgement a certain community of known constituents, such that they mutually exclude each other, and yet thereby determine in their totality the knowledge".<sup>25</sup>

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., p. 109.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., p. 116.

Thus Kant deduces the concepts of inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and community from the judgements which are categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive respectively. All these concepts are interrelated because, "community is the causality of substances reciprocally determining one another".<sup>26</sup>

According to modality, judgements are either problematic, or assertoric, or apodeictic. Kant says, "problematic judgements are those in which affirmation or negation is taken as merely possible (optional)".<sup>27</sup> Thus, "Earth exists through an external cause" is a problematic judgement because it can possibly be either affirmed or negated. Kant maintains that the concepts of possibility and impossibility are involved in a problematic judgement because it can be regarded either as possible or as impossible.

"There exists a perfect justice", is an assertoric judgement because the existence of a perfect justice is merely an assertion, which can either be affirmed or denied in existence. On this basis, Kant deduces the concepts of "existence and non-existence" from the judgement which is assertoric.

"Socrates must be mortal" is an apodeictic judgement because it expresses necessity and excludes contingency. Kant deduces the concepts of necessity and contingency from the judgement which is apodeictic.

So Kant deduces the concepts of possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence and necessity and contingency from judgements which are problematic, assertoric and apodeictic respectively. These concepts are related to one another on the basis that, "necessity is just the existence which is given through possibility itself".<sup>28</sup>

Kant, thus, deduces twelve kinds of concepts from the twelve kinds of judgements of general logic. The concepts of the judgements are an abstraction from "all content of knowledge."<sup>29</sup> That is to say, the concepts of general logic are an

26 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 109-10.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 116.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 111.



abstraction from the manifold of sensible intuition given in the form of space and time. Consequently these concepts are regarded by Kant as empty. But when these empty concepts are applied to content of knowledge, they lose their significance as concepts of general logic and become the concepts of transcendental logic, which, "has lying before it a manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding"<sup>30</sup> The difference between general logic and transcendental logic is that while the former has concepts without any content, the latter tries to apply the concepts of the former to the content of knowledge.

Transcendental logic, according to Kant, makes a synthesis of the manifold of a priori sensibility which constitutes the object of knowledge. By synthesis, he means, "The act of putting different representations together, and grasping what is manifold in them in one (act of) knowledge,"<sup>31</sup> That is to say, synthesis is the act of combination and organization of the manifold of a priori sensibility. Without the act of synthesis, there would be given in the form of space and time a manifold of sensible intuition (the object of knowledge) which is crude and confused. In order to provide a universal and necessary connection to the manifold of sensible intuitions, they have to be synthesized by the concepts of transcendental logic which are applicable to the sensible intuitions, therefore those concepts are regarded by Kant as "categories".<sup>32</sup> Therefore, the concepts of transcendental logic and categories are identical. Since the concepts of transcendental logic are the concepts of general logic which are derived from understanding as a faculty of judgement, therefore Kant states that understanding gives rise to certain concepts which are known as categories when they are applied to determine sensible intuitions.

The categories, according to Kant, are "original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself a priori".<sup>33</sup> On this basis, he considers Aristotle's position on

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid, p. 113.

33 Ibid.

categories as defective because the latter "merely picked them up as they came in his way".<sup>34</sup> Kant states that Aristotle derives categories from sensibility while it has no place in the categories "that trace their origin to the understanding"<sup>35</sup> He regards categories as a priori. But categories are empty if they are not applied to the sensible intuitions which are the objects of knowledge. Therefore categories and sensible intuitions must come together in order to give knowledge of something. But they can come together only if there is something common both for the categories and the objects of knowledge (sensible intuition). Therefore Kant says.

"Obviously there must be something which is homogeneous. On the one hand with the categories, and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. Such a representation is transcendental schema."<sup>36</sup>

That is why there must be a transcendental schema in order to bring categories and sensible intuition together. Kant regards the concept of time as the transcendental schema because, "since time is both sensible and a priori, it has something in common both with the sensible manifold and with the pure category, and, therefore, enables this mediation to be effected."<sup>37</sup>

Kant, thus, conceives time as the basis of the mediation between categories and the manifold of sensible intuitions. He divides time, as a transcendental schema, into four heads in accordance with the division of categories into four heads.

The transcendental schema of the category of quantity (unity, plurality and totality) is regarded by him as number.<sup>38</sup> "An object which is given in perception is quantity only if it

34 Ibid., p. 114

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., p. 181.

37 A. C. Ewing *A Short Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, The University of Chicago Press Limited, London, 1970, p. 145.

38 Kant : *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 183

can be measured. Measurement implies the addition of units which is necessarily a succession in time"<sup>39</sup> Kant states that a manifold of sensible intuition can be determined by the category of quantity, only if this manifold can be measured. This measurement implies the addition of units one by one therefore, it implies number. Since addition of units is possible only in a succession of time, so the category of quantity can determine the manifold of sensible intuition through number which is homogeneous both with the category of quantity and sensible intuition—in so far as it can be measured. Kant, thus, regards number as the transcendental schema, that is to say, time, of the category of quantity.

The transcendental schema of the category of quality (reality, negation, limitation) is regarded by Kant as degree of intensity, i.e. every manifold of intuition is capable of increasing and decreasing in intensity (which is a succession in time). The schematized category of reality refers to a manifold of sensible intuition in so far as it (sensible intuition) has some degree of intensity; that is to say, it can be regarded as a "being in time"<sup>40</sup>. That of the category of negation refers to a "not-being (in time)"<sup>41</sup>. Kant also holds that the category of reality can be applied to a sensible intuition and can never be applied to thing-in-itself. Therefore reality has its limitation; that is to say, it is limited in time in accordance with its intensity. Kant, thus, regards the degree of intensity as the transcendental schema; that is to say, time, of the category of quality.

As regards the category of relation (substance, causality and community); the transcendental schema of the substance is "permanence of the real in time",<sup>42</sup> that of causality is "the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subject to a rule",<sup>43</sup> that of community is, "the coexistence, according to a universal rule, of the determinations of the one substance, with those of the other"<sup>44</sup>. So substance, as a category, is a succes-

39 S. Korner . *Kant*, p. 73

40 Kant . *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 184.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid

43 Ibid , p. 158

44 Ibid

sion in time in accordance with certain rules and interaction, as a category, is the duration of the coexistence of one substance with another. Kant, thus, regards permanence, succession and duration as the transcendental schema, that is to say, time, of the category of relation.

The transcendental schema of the category of modality (possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence, necessity-contingency) are—the schema of possibility is possibility in time and that of impossibility is not possibility in time. The schema of existence is existence in time and that of non existence is not an existence in time. The schema of necessity is being an object at all time,<sup>45</sup> and that of contingency is being an object at no time. Thus the category of modality is related with the transcendental schema, that is to say, with time.

Kant, thus, states that the transcendental schema leads to the applicability of the categories to the manifold of sensible intuition. Thus the category of quantity leads it to the apprehension of the succession of an object, quality leads to the apprehension of qualities of a manifold of sensible intuition, the category of relation leads to the connection of one sensible intuition with another, and finally, the category modality determines how an object can belong to time.

With the determination of categories, according to Kant, all the manifolds of sensible intuitions (the objects of knowledge) are given a universal and necessary order which were earlier discrete and unconnected. But they are given a universal and necessary connection only by virtue of the categories and therefore Kant says that categories constitute the a priori basis of human cognition. The constitution of knowledge by the categories is regarded by Kant as the activity of human mind because, "...it is, after all, we ourselves who are responsible for the formation of general concepts. Conceptions are something which the mind produces actively, and it is precisely in this respect that they differ from perceptions. In so far, therefore, as we exercise our power of entertaining general ideas, we must be said to have gone entirely beyond the state of mere acceptance of the given. Or to put it in another way, our ability to

render the given intelligible to ourselves, and to describe it, under the guidance of general words, is an expression of genuine intellectual activity"<sup>46</sup> Kant, consequently, assigns ". to the human intellect the characteristics of activity",<sup>47</sup> and from such an activity of human mind, he deduces the categories. The activity of the human mind is entitled by Kant as an a priori activity because there is not even the least hindrance of sensible intuitions in it. Thus, categories are formed out of the a priori activity of the human mind and the sensible-intuitions have no place in the process of the formation of the categories.

Kant, however, does not show how different categories are related to one another. As a matter of fact, he deduces all the twelve kinds of categories from the concepts of the twelve kinds of judgements. He discusses every kind of judgement in isolation from other kinds. Therefore, the categories deduced from the judgements are also considered in isolation from one another. But one may show that there is a relationship among the categories because they are derived from one original source i.e. understanding, as a faculty of judgement. Being derived from understanding, the categories are regarded by Kant as a priori. In this way, every category has one common characteristic, namely it is derived from understanding and it is a priori. Further the categories are also related to one another, because they are derived by Kant from the twelve kinds of judgements which seem to be related to one another.

Every judgement may be regarded to have quantity, quality, relation and modality. For instance, in "All men are mortal" the quantity is "all" which is regarded by Kant as universal. He holds that the quantity of a judgement is universal, particular or singular. The quantity of the judgement gives rise to the concepts of unity, plurality or totality.

Further the quality of the judgement "All men are mortal", is affirmative. The quality of the judgement, according to Kant, is affirmative, negative or infinite and gives rise to the concept of reality, negation or limitation. "All men are mortal" has both the quantity and the quality of the judgement ; the

<sup>46</sup> H W Cassirer : *Kant's First Critique*, p 55.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid

quantity is "all" which is universal and the quality is that it is affirmative. The relationship between quantity and quality of the judgement can be regarded as affirmative.

The quantity and quality of a judgement depends on the relation of the subject to the predicate. This relationship is categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive. The categorical relationship may have the quantity of universal, or particular or singular and may have the quality of being affirmative, negative or infinite. Consequently the categorical relationship between subject and predicate may have its corresponding concepts of quantity, quality and relation of the judgement.

A judgement is deemed to have modality if it is regarded as problematic, assertoric or apodeictic. The problematic judgement expresses quality by affirming or negating the judgement. The affirmation and negation also expresses the quantity and relation of the judgement. The quantity expresses the judgement as either universal affirmative or universal negative. The relation is expressed in the form of the verb "to be" which is called the copula. Since the modality is related to the quantity, quality and relation of the judgement so the concepts of modality must have their relations to the corresponding concepts of quantity, quality and relation of the judgement.

In this way, all the twelve kinds of judgements, given by Kant, can be regarded as interrelated. Therefore, the concepts of the judgements are also mutually interrelated. Since these concepts are regarded by Kant as categories when they are applied to the sensible intuitions, so all the categories can also be regarded as interrelated. The categories may also be regarded as interrelated because they are applicable to the sensible intuitions only by the transcendental schema which is maintained by Kant as homogeneous, on the one hand with the categories and on the other hand with the sensible intuition.

Further this entire complex, i.e. the categories of understanding, the transcendental schema and the sensible intuitions, according to Kant, are brought to the unity of apperception which provides the ultimate unity to the sensible intuitions with the categories of understanding. The unity of apperception perceives all things and events in the form of space and time, and comprehends them under the categories of unity, reality,

substantiality, casuality, etc. For Kant, the unity of apperception constitutes the ultimate subject of knowledge. He writes, "The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human cognition"<sup>48</sup> The unity of apperception is an awareness of an "I think", or the thinking ego, which can be regarded as continuous, active, and present in the series of representations only if the representations are given in a unity with one another through the thinking ego.

But the judgement "I think", according to Kant, contains no knowledge of the "I" because it can never be given in sensible-intuitions. And if the categories are applied to the unity of apperception, there arise paralogisms which are formally invalid conclusions. The fallacy arises when certain conclusions are drawn from the judgement "I think" namely, (i) that the soul is a substance, (ii) that it is simple, (iii) that it is a person, (iv) that it is in relation to possible objects in space. These are the four kinds of paralogisms through which Kant attempts to prove that the unity of apperception is unknown and unknowable. But it may be pointed out that for him, unity of apperception is the logical presupposition for the unity between the categories of understanding and the sensible intuitions.

Further the categories of understanding cannot be applied to things-in-themselves, because the latter can never be given in sensible intuition. He states that things-in-themselves are the ground and cause of the appearances. Therefore they exist and act on our senses through which manifold of sensible intuition is produced. But neither the category of cause, nor the category of existence, nor any other category can be applied to things-in-themselves. "They cannot, therefore, be viewed as applicable to things-in-themselves, independent of all questions as to whether and how those may be given to us.. the only manner in which objects can be given to us is by modification of our sensibility and finally, that pure a priori concepts, in addition to the function of understanding expressed in the category ."<sup>49</sup>

48 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, Tr by N K Smith, p. 154.

49 Ibid., pp. 181-2

Kant's conception of things-in-themselves seem contradictory because, on the one hand, he states that they exist and are the ground and cause of appearances, and on the other hand, he maintains that none of the categories can be applied to them and they remain unknown and unknowable. This problem has been discussed in an earlier chapter where it has been shown that Kantian things-in-themselves can, in spite of contradiction, be regarded as materialist basis of his ontology.

In the above account, it has been shown that for Kant, the transcendental consciousness and the thing-in-itself constitute the two ultimate basis of human cognition, but both of them remain unknown and unknowable. In his analysis, the categories, which are derived from the logical employment of understanding, can be applied to a thing given in sensible-intuitions, and the knowledge, which is thus constituted, is what Kant calls synthetic a priori. It constitutes the actual and possible sphere of scientific knowledge or phenomena. Such a knowledge is possible only through the transcendental consciousness and the thing-in-itself. Therefore, there is relationship among Kant's epistemology, logic and ontology (transcendental consciousness, thing-in-itself and phenomenon).

On the basis of such an epistemological situation, i.e. synthetic a priori judgements, Kant attempts to reconcile the claims of rationalism with those of empiricism. In the rationalist tradition, for instance, Descartes (1591-1650) maintains that reason alone can provide clear and distinct knowledge and, "...consequently it seems to me that I can already establish a general rule that all the things we conceive very clearly and distinctly are true".<sup>50</sup> He regards sensibility as a faculty of confused knowledge, "...for perception by the senses is very obscure and confused in many ways"<sup>51</sup>

In Descartes, there is a cleavage between mind and matter. This cleavage is effected immediately by his method of radically and evacuating doubt which enables him to suspend belief in the existence of everything represented in mind as an object,

50 Rene Descartes *Discourse on Method and Meditations*, Tr by F.E. Sutcliffe, Penguin Books, 1979, p. 113.

51 Ibid., p. 158.



while it compels him to assert the existence and activity of his own mind. He, thus, makes the assertion, "I think, therefore, I am,"<sup>52</sup> and establishes dualism from the outset. He asserts the existence of mind on the basis of thinking which is devoid of sensibility.

But Kant disagrees with Descartes because Descartes has underestimated sensibility by regarding thought or reason as an infallible criterion of truth in the clearness and distinctness of ideas. He maintains that thought or categories "cannot of themselves give us any knowledge.. that they come to have real significance is due to the fact that they are brought to bear upon empirical intuitions, and have to be employed in this manner, since otherwise proper knowledge of sense-given would remain an impossibility."<sup>53</sup>

At the same time, Kant also tries to justify the claims of Descartes that there are certain concepts which can own their origin to reason alone (he uses the expression understanding). He states that the concepts and categories are a priori—they do not own their origin to sensible intuition which are synthetic—but they are valid for objects in so far as objects can be given in sensible intuition. Kant, therefore, circumscribes sensible intuitions to the expanse reason (his a priori concepts) in Descartes.

On the basis of this doctrine Kant is opposed to Hume who regards sense perception as the source of knowledge only and exclusively and confines human cognition to what is merely synthetic. Hume writes, 'All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p. 54.

<sup>53</sup> H W. Cassirer *Kant's First Critique*, pp. 87-8.

they make their first appearance in the soul By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning .”<sup>54</sup>

Thus, according to Hume, all our knowledge is derived from sense-perceptions which dissolve into impressions and ideas. Hume is, thus, epistemologically an idealist He also maintains that there is no necessary connection between one perception and another “... all our perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be considered as separately existent, and may exist separately and have no need of anything else to support their existence.”<sup>55</sup> Hume is, thus, ontologically a pluralist Further, according to him, the impressions and ideas are received by the self He says, “..self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have reference”<sup>56</sup> And since impressions and ideas are discrete and unconnected, so the self is nothing but “a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity”.<sup>57</sup> For Hume there can be no existence of self apart from impressions and ideas, because, “.. when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception.”<sup>58</sup> Thus, he rejects the existence of self apart from impressions and ideas.

Kant accepts Hume's premise that universality and necessity cannot be derived from sense-perception because every perception seems entirely loose and separate. Therefore, Kant states that the universal and necessary connections in the field of appearances are given by the a priori activity of human mind.

54 David Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature* Book One, ed by D G C. Macnabb Fontana/Collins, 1978, p. 45

55 Ibid., p. 283-4.

56 Hume : *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. by L.A. Salby—Bigge ; Third edition revised by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p. 301.

57 Ibid., p. 302.

58 Ibid., pp. 301-302.

He writes, "Appearances do indeed present cases from which a rule can be obtained according to which something usually happens, but they never prove the sequences to be necessary"<sup>59</sup> Therefore, he adds, "Since universality and necessity of the rule would not be grounded a priori, but only on induction, they would be merely fictitious and without genuinely universal validity"<sup>60</sup> On this basis, Kant writes, "...the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there"<sup>61</sup>

Therefore, Kant criticizes Hume's pluralism because the means through which the sensible-intuitions are organized, cannot be furnished from that. According to Kant, Hume has degraded human mind to mere passivity without activity over the materials provided by the senses. Hume's attempt to confine human cognition to impressions and ideas is, for Kant, a denial of the a priori activity of the human mind.

Kant also criticizes Hume when he tries to catch the self because the unity between sensible intuitions and the categories is provided by transcendental consciousness which itself can never be given in sensible intuitions. Transcendental consciousness is a unitary one for Kant and it is the logical presupposition of all knowledge

In this way, he introduces a radical change in his interpretation of cognitive-process. He places mind at the centre of cognitive-process, and claims that objects cannot determine the mind. It is the human mind which determines the objects because mind actively organizes the sensible intuitions through the categories, and thus makes all knowledge as synthetic a priori possible

There are, however, various shortcomings involved in Kant's analysis of the categories and his epistemology as a whole. The basic shortcoming lies in his attempt at conceiving the categories as a priori by deducting them from the logical

<sup>59</sup> Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 125.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p. 223.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p. 147.

employment of understanding, whereas categories are derived from men's centuries of practical and cognitive activities upon objective reality. For example, what do we mean by one or singular existing in the world, before there was either one horse, or one man, or one planet, or one anything else? How can there be the category of unity without there being the unity of something? How can we form the category of cause and effect by itself without any actual cause-effect relationship in the real world? Hence, it is impossible to conceive the emergence of the categories prior to man's interaction with objective reality. Kant is, therefore, wrong in his attempt to conceive the categories by isolating them from objective reality. The shortcomings in Kant's analysis of the categories lies in his attempt to subjectify the categories by making them mind-dependent, whereas they are essentially objective and independent of the human mind. Thus the problems of epistemology cannot be solved within the framework of Kant's philosophy.

In order to solve the problems of epistemology, the basis of human cognition has to be regarded as the practical activity whereby man comes across objective reality. Marx has rightly pointed out that knowledge can neither occur, nor can it develop outside its relation to action, the aim of which is to change what is known. "Knowledge", he says, "is that activity of man whereby he comes into interaction with the world and understands it so as to transform it."<sup>62</sup> Marx's view of knowledge is an active process of the apprehension of objective reality and it is indissolubly linked with the transformation of objective reality.

It seems that Marx appreciates the constitute activity of the categories of understanding in Kant, but he regards such an a priori activity as one-sided, "abstractly"<sup>63</sup> due to which Kant goes too far towards "idealism".<sup>64</sup> He rejects such an a priori activity in Kant, and asserts, "The real basis of human

62 Norman D. Livergood · *Activity in Marx's Philosophy* ; Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1967, p. 22.

63 Marx and Engels: *The German Ideology* ; Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 615.

64 Ibid.

life is man's activity. It is the action of man—his labour, his associations—which serves the foundations for ideas and not vice-versa<sup>65</sup>. For him, in the cognitive-process both the subject of cognition and the objects of cognition are equally active, unlike Kant who rejects the activity of the objects (sensible intuitions) and accepts the activity of mind only and exclusively. As opposed to Kant, Marx's view of knowledge, according to Prof. Livergood, "... is active in two senses: First, knowledge is an active interrelationship between subject and object. Secondly, apprehension gained from this process must itself be active. Ideas cannot be passive images; they must be active instruments."<sup>66</sup>

Such an epistemological situation shows that human thought would function and develop, only through interaction with objective reality. Therefore the laws of human thought are inseparably linked with the laws of the change and development of objective reality. And the categories of human cognition reflect the most fundamental properties and connections in objective reality. And since objective reality is always in a state of constant interaction and change through which it manifests its properties, so the categories, which reflect those properties, must also be interrelated, mobile, and in appropriate circumstances must pass into one another. In this context, Lenin points out, "Human concepts are not fixed, but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, otherwise they do not reflect the living life."<sup>67</sup> This position of Marx and Lenin has been explained by Dr. Suman Gupta in the following words:

"... according to dialectical materialist methodology, the theoretical and the practical, the abstract and the concrete, the universal and the particular, the form and the content, the deduction and the induction, the rational and the empirical cannot be separated. Human knowledge does not constitute a catalogue of the isolated particular objects and processes but

65 Norman D. Livergood *Activity in Marx's Philosophy*, p. 10

66 Ibid., p. 22

67 V.I. Lenin *Collected Works*; Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, vol. 33, p. 263

it consists of the cognition of the laws of development of natural and social reality''<sup>68</sup>

Therefore, for Marx and Lenin, there is a dialectical unity among epistemology, logic and ontology. Such a unity rejects Kantian epistemological situation through which the thing-in-itself (the objective basis) remains unknown and unknowable. With the dialectical unity, it can be shown that objective reality, though existing independent of human consciousness, is essentially knowable.

Such an epistemological situation is always aimed at changing objective reality, but Kant's epistemology is not. Man is able to change objective reality only on the basis of the necessary causal laws operating in objective reality.

68 Dr Suman Gupta, *The Origin and Theories of Linguistic Philosophy* (A Marxist point of view); Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, pp 17-8.

## An Analysis and Examination of Cause and Effect in Kant's Epistemology

In continuation of what has been said in the last chapter, here an analysis will be made of the category of cause and effect in Kant's epistemology and its relation to thing-in-itself. Kant's views on cause-effect relationship will be discussed first, in the light of the problems raised by Hume and secondly, in the context of the common points as well as differences with Aristotle and Locke on the one hand and Engels, Lenin and Einstein on the other

Before discussing Kant's specific position, Hume's views on cause-effect relationship should be examined to bring out their shortcomings and on their basis discuss Kant's position. Hume says :

"All events seem entirely loose and separate One event follows another but we can never observe any tie between them, they seem conjoined but never connected."<sup>1</sup>

Here Hume denies that there is any necessary causal relation among the objective things and events He regards every material thing as entirely loose and separate His denial of causal relations among material things and events is based

1 David Hume *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, p 74.

on his epistemological and ontological positions. According to Hume, our knowledge is confined to the sphere of impressions and ideas, and any external reality beyond them is absolutely incomprehensible. He writes :

"Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind ; it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible ; let us chase our imagination to the heavens or to the utmost limits of the universe, we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass"

Further Hume is ontologically a pluralist. He says . "... all our perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to support their existence"<sup>3</sup>

Hume's idealist and pluralist position becomes evident when he regards distinct perceptions as distinct existences.

He divides all knowledge into two kinds, "relations of ideas and matters of fact"<sup>4</sup>. The former includes "... the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain"<sup>5</sup>. Such a knowledge is deductive and a priori and all mathematical propositions are relations of ideas. On the other hand, the knowledge of matters of fact, according to Hume, are synthetic because one cannot claim of their certainty. He says, "The contrary to every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality."<sup>6</sup> He states that the knowledge of matters

2 Hume : *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book One, ed. p. 113-4.

3 Ibid, pp. 283-4.

4 Ibid (Appendix B), p. 354

5 Ibid

6 Ibid, (Appendix B).



of fact are contingent, because they do not have the characteristics of universality and necessity. Hume says :

"When it is asked, what is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matters of fact, the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again, it is asked, what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? It may be replied in one word, Experience."

For Hume, the knowledge of matters of fact are ultimately based on experience. By experience, he means, impressions and ideas which are regarded by him as discrete and unconnected. On this basis, he states that the knowledge of matters of fact are contingent and probable. And since the relation of cause and effect, according to him, is based on experience, so the cause and effect relationship can never be regarded as universal and necessary, because it is based on impressions and ideas which cannot provide universal and necessary connection.

But Kant differs from Hume's distinction of knowledge between relations of ideas and matters of fact, because such a distinction cannot make scientific knowledge as synthetic a priori possible. Kant, therefore, tries to show that the propositions of mathematics, geometry and physics are not only a priori but also synthetic. He writes, "All mathematical judgements without exception, are synthetic."<sup>8</sup> He illustrates it with the example of an arithmetical proposition, like,  $7+5=12$ . According to Kant, the idea of 12, "is by no means already thought in merely thinking the union of 7 and 5, and I may analyse my concept of such a possible sum as long as I please, still I shall never find the 12 in it."<sup>9</sup> Kant states that the idea of 12 can neither come from the ideas of 7 and 5, nor from that of their combination. Therefore, "we have to go outside these concepts, and call in the aid of intuition..."<sup>10</sup> Kant holds that it is only with the aid of sensible intuition, that is,

7 Hume *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, p. 32.

8 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction, p. 52.

9 Ibid., p. 53.

10 Ibid.

by referring, say, to our seven fingers and adding one by one to 5 that we get 12. Therefore the proposition  $7+5=12$  is regarded by Kant as a synthetic proposition.

At the same time, he holds that all mathematical propositions are always a priori, because "they carry with them necessity, which cannot be derived from experience".<sup>11</sup> Thus the proposition  $7+5=12$ , expresses necessity of proposition and the concept of necessity can never be derived from sensible intuition and must, therefore, be regarded as a priori. Kant, thus attempts to prove that the propositions of arithmetics are synthetic a priori.

Similarly the propositions of geometry and physics are also regarded by Kant as synthetic a priori. This has already been discussed earlier.

Thus, Kant holds an epistemological constitution which attempts to show not only that Hume is false, but also that his (Hume's) falsity has its source in misunderstanding the problems of epistemology. According to Kant, when Hume assigns the question of causal relations to the knowledge of matters of fact, then he (Hume), "occupied himself exclusively with the synthetic proposition regarding the connection of an effect with its cause, and he believed himself to have shown that such an a priori proposition is entirely impossible".<sup>12</sup>

In his attempt to resolve Hume's problem, Kant says "...the very concept of a cause so manifestly contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule, that the concept would be altogether lost if we attempted to derive it, as Hume has done, from a repeated associations of that which happens with that which precedes and a custom of connecting representations, a custom originating in this repeated association, and constituting therefore a merely subjective necessity."<sup>13</sup>

Kant agrees with Hume that a manifold of sensible intuition (Hume uses the expression impression) cannot provide necessary causal relations among things and events. He, therefore,

11 Ibid, p. 52

12 Ibid., Introduction, p. 55.

13 Ibid, Introduction, p. 44

tries to introduce the causal relations through the a priori activity of the human mind. Kant says, "The accepted view is that only through the perception and comparison of events repeatedly following in a uniform manner upon preceding appearances are we enabled to discover a rule according to which certain events always follow upon certain appearances and that this is the way in which we are first led to construct to ourselves the concept of cause. Now the concept, if thus formed, would be merely empirical, and the rule which it supplies, that everything which happens has a cause, would be as contingent as the experience upon which it is based. Since the universality and necessity of the rule would not be grounded a priori, but only on induction, they would be merely fictitious and without genuinely universal validity"<sup>14</sup> On this basis, he tries to refute Hume's view that cause and effect relationships are contingent and probable.

Kant, however, maintains that the category of causation is possible only by holding fast to the category of substance. "causality leads to the concept of action, this in turn to the concept of force, and therefore to the concept of substance".<sup>15</sup> The category of causation is possible only in the category of substance and therefore Kant is opposed to Hume who has denied the concept of substance. Hume says, "The idea of substance must, therefore, be derived from impression of reflection, if it really exists. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotion, none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it"<sup>16</sup> Here he states that the concept of substance cannot be maintained because none of the impressions and ideas can provide any knowledge of it.

But Kant maintains that if the concept of substance is denied then there is no possibility of the concepts of activity and force because "wherever there is action—and therefore activity and

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 223.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> Hume. *A Treatise of Human Nature*; Book One, pp. 59-60

force—there is also substance, and it is in substance alone that the seat of this fruitful source of appearances must be sought”<sup>17</sup> He defines an action as that which “signifies the relation of the subject of causality to its effect”.<sup>18</sup> Action is “. the first ground of all change of appearances ”<sup>19</sup> According to Kant every change in the appearances implies the succession of the appearance to another This succession is possible only in time Therefore Kant regards “all appearances are in time , and in it alone can either coexistence or successions be represented”<sup>20</sup> He, thus, maintains that “time is that in which all changes in appearances can be conceived But time “remains and does not change”<sup>21</sup> Time is that in which all changes in the appearances take place, but time itself does not change along with the changes in the appearances ; “for it is that in which and as determinations of which, succession or coexistence can alone be presented”<sup>22</sup> But time is something which can never be perceived, so there “...must be found in the subjects of perception, that is in the appearances, substratum which represents time in general , and all change or coexistence must, in being apprehended, be perceived in this substratum, and through relation of appearances to it”.<sup>23</sup> The existence in appearance is possible only in the concept of substance and “. all that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination of substance”<sup>24</sup> But the concept of substance does not change in accordance with the changes in the appearances. It always, “remains ever the same”.<sup>25</sup> Kant says :

“In all change of appearances substance is permanent , its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished ”<sup>26</sup>

The unchangeable in the existence of appearances, according

17 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 229

18 Ibid

19 Ibid

20 Ibid , p. 213

21 Ibid

22 Ibid

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid , p. 218

to Kant, is the substance which can neither increase nor diminish in quantity. On this basis, he says that the concept of substance is something in which the cause-effect relationship can be conceived because, "All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect"<sup>27</sup>

But the cause-effect relationship, according to Kant, can be applied to an object only in so far as it can be given in sensible intuition, and it can never be applied to things-in-themselves though, "we cannot even think of physical objects as appearances of things-in-themselves without thinking of them as determined by the latter, which involves the category of causality"<sup>28</sup> Kant regards things-in-themselves as the ground and cause of appearances, though they are unknown and unknowable. He, however, says, "...though we cannot know these objects as things-in-themselves we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things-in-themselves..."<sup>29</sup>

Kant makes a distinction between knowing and thinking. We can know an object only in so far as the object can be given in sensible intuition and is determined by the categories. But an object, in so far as it can never be given in sensible intuition, can never be known. However, thinking is possible even if there were no sensible intuition. So we can think of things-in-themselves as the cause of appearances but we cannot know them, because, "How things may be in themselves, apart from the representations through which they affect us, is entirely outside the sphere of knowledge"<sup>30</sup>

In the context of Kant's things-in-themselves which are concerned with thinking and not with knowing, A.C. Ewing explains, "We do not know anything about things-in-themselves, but we can do what might be described as thinking them in a sort of way, and his assertion of their unknowability is not based on any assumptions about their nature but on the mere absence of those spatial and temporal features which can be presupposed

27 Ibid

28 A.C. Ewing *A Short Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p 187.

29 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p 27.

30 Ibid., p 220

in human knowledge. Again, we have no knowledge of them according to the categories, but we can and must use the categories in thinking of them however indeterminate and formal this use must inevitable be."<sup>31</sup> So "Kant uses the term 'categories' to mean sometimes 'pure categories' and sometimes 'schematized categories' and in the former sense he asserts and in the latter denies the possibility of employing them in our thought of things-in-themselves."<sup>32</sup>

Ewing explains Kant's position that we can think of things-in-themselves as the cause of appearances only in terms of causation as a pure category. An when causation as a pure category is schematized by the transcendental schema, then it fails to provide any knowledge of things-in-themselves. Ewing further says, "Causality in its unschematized form is ground, which is certainly not a notion totally without meaning, and it was causality that Kant was chiefly, if not only, concerned to apply. When we think of things-in-themselves in terms of causality, what we do, according to Kant, I suppose, is to think something real as related either to something else real or to a phenomenon by a relation such as that which holds between a phenomenal cause and a phenomenal effect except that it is regarded as non-temporal."<sup>33</sup>

In this way Ewing interprets Kant's things-in-themselves by saying that we cannot know them in terms of schematized categories. But we can think of them in terms of unschematized pure categories. Though Kant has not explained things-in-themselves in terms of schematized categories and unschematized categories, Ewing's interpretation conforms to Kant's premise, "We cannot think an object save through categories, we cannot know an object so thought save through intuition corresponding to these concepts."<sup>34</sup> Kant holds that to think an object means to think through the categories. The categories, if they are taken in terms of schematized categories, then they will con-

31 A.C Ewing, *A Short Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 188

32 Ibid, p 180

33 Ibid

34 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, Tr N K Smith p. 173

tradict Kantian notion of thinking, because the schematized categories require the corresponding manifold of sensible intuition. Therefore when Kant regards things-in-themselves as the cause of appearances, then he is thinking of things-in-themselves in terms of unschematized and pure category of causation.

The category of causation in so far as it is schematized, according to Kant, can be applied to the extent in so far as an object can be given in sensible intuition. The transcendental schema of the category of cause and effect, is "the real upon which, whenever, posited, something else always follows. It consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subject to a rule"<sup>35</sup> The successions of objects are possible only by the transcendental schema of the category of cause and effect which comprehends that every succession is in time. Kant states that every succession must have a rule through which the emergence of an object can be regarded as caused by some other object. Our knowledge of the succession of an object is possible only through the a priori activity of our mind.

Kant, in this way, tries to show that the category of causation, which plays the pivotal role in scientific knowledge, cannot be conceived within the framework of Hume's philosophy. In Kant's analysis, causal relations can be regarded as universal and necessary, only if they are shown to be more than the product of sensible intuitions. For that purpose, Kant tries to show that cause-effect relationship in the sphere of phenomenon is introduced by the a priori activity of the human mind.

Kant's views on category of cause and effect can also be analysed in the context of the relations as well as differences with Aristotle and Locke on the one hand, and Engels, Lenin and Einstein on the other.

In the earliest European thought, Aristotle gives an account of causation as fourfold, based on the four angles of vision from which any object in its process of production may be viewed. He says, "Cause denotes that from which (as imminent material) a thing comes into being...The form or pattern of a

thing (i.e. the formula of its essence), the classes to which it belongs, and its own parts. The starting point of change or rest.. In general, the maker is the cause of the thing made, and that which changes of that which suffers change. The end, i.e. that for the sake of which the thing is made."<sup>36</sup>

Aristotle illustrates it with an example. He chooses a statue in the process of its being carved out of a block of marble. The block is regarded by him as its material cause which he calls as immanent cause, the muscular energy and the instruments used by the sculptor efficient causes, the form or figure to be produced determines the formal cause and the purpose towards which the whole process is directed the final cause.

Aristotle states that causation involves the categories of substance, activity, quality and passivity, which have been discussed earlier in the previous chapter. In the context of causation, therefore, the category of substance can be regarded as the immanent material cause, the category of activity as the efficient cause, the category of quality as the formal cause, and the category of passivity is manifested in the final cause. And since categories are regarded as the fundamental concepts which belong to material things and events, so causation must be regarded as a fundamental concept, which belongs to material things and events.

Kant agrees with Aristotle that the category of causation involves force and action which belong to the category of substance. But whereas in Aristotle the category of causation reflects the fundamental features of the sensible substance, in Kant, it is a priori and causal relations in the phenomenal world is introduced by the activity of the human mind. Kant, therefore, differs from Aristotle regarding the origin of the category of causation.

Kant's views on causation are in certain respects similar and in certain respects dissimilar to those of Locke. The similarities become evident when Locke writes, "power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called causes, and the substances which thereupon are produced or



the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power are called effects" <sup>37</sup> But Kant differs from Locke's interpretation of these concepts For Locke, "that which produces any simple or complex idea we denote by the general name, cause and that which is produced, effect" <sup>38</sup> He states that in every material substance, there is some power through which one material substance acts on another material substance and thus certain changes are brought about Therefore simple ideas are produced out of that power in material substances Locke makes a distinction between power and motion He says, ". motion is rather a passion than an action" <sup>39</sup> Thus, when a ball obeys the stroke of a billiard stick, "it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion" <sup>40</sup> Therefore motion is not something which is inherent in a material substance, instead it is produced to a material substance through something foreign to it

Locke, thus, conceives cause and effect relationship among material substances in terms of power which brings certain changes in them He maintains that matter as a substance, has an independent existence But the power which belongs to material substance, he does not regard as its inherent property Though he accepts a causal relation among material substances, he says the power, which gives rise to causation, has "as its author God".<sup>41</sup> In this way, Locke uses his concept of power as the basis for an argument to the existence of God in order to get power started originally.

Kant's position is different from that of Locke, in the sense that though like Locke, he advocates necessary causal connection in the phenomenal world, yet where Locke ascribes the origin of causation to God, he ascribes it to the very constitution of Mind. Kant maintains, "Neither bodies nor motions are anything outside us, both alike are mere representations in us ; and it is not, therefore, the motion of matter that produces

37 Locke *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, p 155

38 Ibid , p 155

39 Ibid , p 107.

40 Ibid

41 Ibid , p 106.

representations in us, the motion itself is representation only, as also is the matter which makes itself known in this way"<sup>42</sup> Motion is regarded by him as a representation through which a thing given in sensible intuition can be known. Kant writes :

"Motion presupposes the perception of something movable. But in space, considered in itself, there is nothing movable, consequently the movable must be something that is found in space only through experience, and must therefore be an empirical datum. For the same reason, transcendental aesthetic cannot count the concept of alteration among its a priori data. Time itself does not alter, but only something which is in time."<sup>43</sup>

But how one event gives rise to another cannot be explained within the framework of Kant's epistemology because as he himself says - "How anything can be altered, and how it should be possible that upon one state in a given moment an opposite state may follow in the next moment of this we have not, a priori, the least conception."<sup>44</sup> Kant merely urges that every event must have some cause in what immediately precedes it, but how one event follows another cannot be explained within his epistemological position.

Engels and Lenin agree with Kant that causal relations must be universal and necessary and that scientific knowledge is possible only on the basis of such a causal relation. But whereas Kant regards the causal relations as a priori, Engels does not, "Matter in motion is the ultimate reality and every material entity is causally interconnected" Engels writes, ". by the activity of human beings, the idea of causality becomes established, the idea that one motion is the cause of another"<sup>45</sup> He states that man come to know the causal relations among the material entities only through his practical activity. Therefore, Engels denies Kant's view that the category of cause and effect is a priori. He affirms that all our categories are derived through

42 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 356.

43 Ibid p. 82

44 Ibid, p. 230

45 F. Engels : *Dialectics of Nature*, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1978, p. 230

centuries of practical and cognitive activities upon objective reality. In this context, Engels, says :

"From whence does thought obtain these principles ? From itself ? No . the forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world ... The principles are not the starting point of investigation, but its final result , they are applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them, it is not nature and the realm of humanity which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history" <sup>46</sup>

Engels maintains that we cannot conceive any form of thought prior to man's interaction with objective reality. The forms of thought are the final results of this interaction. On this basis, he says, "In order to understand the separate phenomena we have to tear them out of the general inter-connection and consider them in isolation, and then the changing motions appear, one as cause and the other as effect" <sup>47</sup> In this way he maintains that the category of cause and effect is derived from man's interaction with objective reality and human cognition develops in accordance with man's attempt to find out various cause-effect relationships among the entities of objective reality.

According to Engels, man is able to change an object and make it serve his own purposes only on the basis of the knowledge of the necessary causal laws operating in objective reality. And that which can be changed, cannot be considered as unknown and unknowable. And if we know all the cause-effect relationships among material entities, then we have known "matter itself." <sup>48</sup> Therefore our knowledge of material things is not only knowledge of them as they appear to us, but also as they are in themselves.

In the context of the unknown and unknowable Kant's things-in-themselves, Lenin states that the knowability of thing-in-itself (the material substance) cannot be conceived within

46 F Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, p 31.

47 F. Engels : *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 232.

48 Ibid

Kantian epistemological situation, because Kant interprets the category of causation subjectively<sup>49</sup> as opposed to its objective nature. Lenin also like Engels maintains that the category of causation is derived from man's interaction with material things and it reflects the properties of material things not only as they appear to us but also as they are in themselves.

Einstein's views on causation also differ from that of Kant. Einstein, as explained by Errol E. Harris, maintains that every material thing is spatio-temporal and is constantly in motion. He states that the movement in a material thing is in accordance with certain laws and knowledge of these laws is the source of the cause-effect relationship. Causal relation, according to Einstein, is " . . . of elements within, or developing states of a system, the whole of which enters into every state and determines the elements and their mutual relations. The relation between cause and effect is never simple but always multiplex. It is the complex relationship between distinguishable (but indissolubly linked) elements within a system, a system, by which that relationship is governed".<sup>50</sup>

Einstein states that causal relations must be regarded as with and within material things and they always express a complex relationship among them unlike Kant who introduces causal relation among things and events by the a priori activity of mind. According to Einstein, there "is, however, no temporal process unless the distinguishing elements are serially identifiable and systematically related. Bare succession . . . is no time. What constitutes temporal succession is a serial order, and while the changes themselves are constituted by the qualitative development of the material in which they occur, their temporal order is determined by the application of a metric to the process so as to relate events to one another as a continuous order. Such correlation of changes with a metrical scale is possible only if there is a rule of succession linking the phases of the process and determining their order. This is

49 V I Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 139

50 Errol E. Harris, *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science*, p. 473

just another aspect of the heterogeneity of the continuum and is the source of the cause-effect relationship".<sup>51</sup>

Einstein holds that the sources of cause-effect relationship among objects and events are possible only when the laws of the succession of objects and events are established, that is to say, the causal relationship is possible when it is established as to how one event under certain circumstances follows another event. But the causal relations of this nature cannot be established within Kant's epistemology because Kant regards causal relations as a priori, whereas how an event follows another can be established only on the basis of experience. For Einstein, cause-effect relationship is with and within the material things and events. This view rejects Kant's concept of thing-in-itself where causal relations cannot be applied. Einstein, thus, refutes Kant's view that causal relations are introduced by the a priori activity of human mind.

To sum up, Kant's views on cause-effect relationship are different from the real and scientific concept as expounded by Engels, Lenin and Einstein. This is so, because Kant interprets the category of cause and effect only subjectively as opposed to its essentially objective nature. Though Kant regards causal relations as universal and necessary, yet he does not construct them from man's interaction with objective reality. Nevertheless, Kant's concept has to be appreciated because as opposed to Hume scientific knowledge, for Kant, is not possible without the categories of understanding and causation is one among the categories. But within the logical framework Kant's views on scientific knowledge, objective reality cannot be changed. It is precisely because Kant limits scientific cognition to the sphere of phenomena. In his analysis, scientific knowledge is confined to what is merely conditioned and it can never penetrate into what is unconditioned. And if the categories of understanding are applied to the unconditioned, then they cease to be valid and there arise antinomies of pure reason. This problem will be discussed in next chapter.

51 Ibid, p. 472

## Antinomies and Dialectics

Here we shall discuss the antinomies of pure reason which are expounded by Kant under Transcendental Dialectic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and on their basis attempt to examine the dialectics of Hegel, on the one hand, and the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, on the other

Antinomies constitute an important place in the composition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The significance of antinomies is that they raise such questions which, according to Kant, human reason can neither comprehend, nor reject. Reason cannot comprehend them because it cannot present them in reality, it cannot reject them because they arise out of reason itself. Therefore in the antinomies, Kant attempts to criticize the concept of reason itself in order to resolve certain contradictions which create a conflict of reason with itself. He claims to curb and curtail the scope of reason and through such an attempt, he says that he has been aroused from his dogmatic slumber. Regarding the significance of the antinomies, Kant writes, "It was the antinomy of pure reason—the world has a beginning, it has no beginning, and so on, right up to 4th: 'There is freedom in man, versus there is no freedom, only the necessity of nature'—that is what first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason

itself, in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself"<sup>1</sup>

An antimony, according to Kant, is a kind of dialectical opposition. By dialectic, he means the "logic of illusion".<sup>2</sup> In order to explain illusion, he first distinguishes it from "probability and appearance".<sup>3</sup> Probability is based on "insufficient grounds"<sup>4</sup> and can provide only "partial truth", but it is never "deceptive".<sup>5</sup> An appearance is also never deceptive and, "it is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err—not because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge at all."<sup>6</sup> Kant also states that the concepts of understanding by themselves would never "fall into error".<sup>7</sup> But since there is no other source of knowledge except understanding and senses, therefore, illusion can be found, "in the judgement, i.e. only in the relation of the object to our understanding".<sup>8</sup>

Kant maintains that there are three kinds of illusion, namely, logical, empirical and transcendental illusions. A logical illusion, "arises entirely from lack of attention to the logical rule. As soon as attention is brought to bear on the case that is before us, the illusion completely disappears".<sup>9</sup> But empirical and transcendental illusions are unavoidable even if their illusory nature has been exposed. In other words, they have a tendency to persist even when they are clearly shown to be illusory. An empirical illusion, for instance, an illusion that the sea appears higher at the horizon than at the shore, cannot be prevented even if it is proved that we see it through higher light rays.

As different from an empirical illusion, a transcendental

1 Kant's letter to Grave, 21 September 1798; Zweig, p. 252, quoted in T. E. Wilkerson's *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 116.

2 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 297.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 299.

illusion, according to Kant, cannot be prevented, because it "carries us altogether beyond the empirical employment of categories and puts us off with a merely deceptive extension of pure understanding"<sup>10</sup> Since the correct employment of the categories of understanding is that they can determine the sensible intuitions, so they have no validity to determine something which can never be given in sensible intuitions. Therefore a transcendental illusion arises when a judgement is made on what is transcendent, i.e. it can neither be proved nor disproved, because that which is transcendent can never be given in sensible intuition.

There are, however, according to Kant, some very important differences among logical, empirical and transcendental illusions. The first two can possibly be either proved or disproved, because they can be given in sensible intuitions. A logical illusion disappears, when it is proved to be illusory. But an empirical illusion persists even if it is clearly shown to be illusory. As different from logical and empirical illusions, a transcendental illusion can neither be proved nor disproved, because it can never be given in sensible intuition.

In the transcendental dialectic, Kant mainly discusses the transcendental illusions and tries to expose "the illusion of transcendent judgements"<sup>11</sup> But transcendental illusion "is something which the transcendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve"<sup>12</sup> Therefore, transcendental dialectic can neither prove nor disprove a transcendental illusion.

Kant states that understanding cannot use its concepts to make judgements on that which is transcendent. It is reason alone which can do so. But reason is incompetent to evolve any concept entirely its own.<sup>13</sup> Therefore reason seeks the assistance of the concepts of understanding in order to make judgements on what is transcendent.

Reason, according to Kant, is always in search of the

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, p. 298.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p. 300.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>13</sup> H.W. Cassirer, *Kant's First Critique*, p. 266.



absolute totality and, "Reason makes this demand in accordance with the principle that if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolute unconditioned (through which alone the conditioned has been possible) is also given"<sup>14</sup> But the unconditioned "is never to be met within experience..."<sup>15</sup> Consequently, concepts of understanding are incapable of determining the unconditioned, And when reason, through the concepts of understanding, attempts to make a judgement on what is unconditioned, then reason fails to present it in reality. Kant states that unconditioned can only be regarded as an idea<sup>16</sup>

Since reason can provide only an idea of the unconditioned and it cannot present the unconditioned in reality so there arises a transcendental illusion which consists in the belief that the idea of unconditioned must represent the unconditioned in reality. Kant claims to expose this illusion In his view, the idea of unconditioned is only a demand of reason because reason is not satisfied with what is merely conditioned and seeks to get the imitations of the unconditioned. But nothing corresponding to unconditioned can be presented in reality, because whatever can be given in reality is always conditioned. Therefore Kant states that the transcendental illusion has its seat in reason itself, because reason is bound to get the unconditioned but fails to present it in reality

According to Kant, when reason demands "the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance",<sup>17</sup> then it comes across a conflict which he states as a conflict between idea and reality. Kant regards this conflict as antinomy and claims that reason can never resolve the antinomy. And since the antinomy between idea and reality is brought out by reason so he regards it as an antinomy of reason itself

Kant maintains that there are four antinomies of pure reason. In each antinomy there is a thesis, with supporting argument, and an antithesis, with supporting argument. Thus by combining

14 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p 386

15 Ibid., p 386.

16 Ibid , p 385.

17 Ibid., p 223.

thesis and antithesis we obtain an antinomy. Kant states that both the thesis and antithesis in every antinomy have equal importance and neither can be regarded as correct exclusively.

The theses of the antinomies study such questions as, the world has a beginning, the soul is a simple substance, there is freedom and there is an Author of the world. But if the views expressed in the thesis are taken to be correct, it would be a "dogmatism of pure reason".<sup>18</sup> Dogmatism is regarded by Kant as an "objection"<sup>19</sup> which consists in "claiming acquaintance with the constitution of the object fuller than that of the counter-assertion"<sup>20</sup>. The views expressed in the thesis of the antinomies are alleged to be dogmatic, only when those views are regarded to be correct without considering the views expressed in the counter-position. And since only reason can provide an insight to the views expressed in the thesis of the antinomies, so these views are regarded by Kant as "dogmatism of pure reason",

On the other hand, the antitheses of the antinomies express the views of "dogmatic empiricism"<sup>21</sup>. The antitheses maintain that everything which can be given in sensibility is correct and that which cannot be given is false. Therefore the antitheses deny the theses because none of the concepts of the theses can possibly be given in sensibility. And since the antitheses regard sensibility as the only source of cognition and that which can be given in sensibility as the only reality, therefore Kant states that the views presented in the antitheses are the views of dogmatic empiricism.

Kant maintains that both the theses and the antitheses of the antinomies in isolation are false because they are "refusing to grant a fair hearing to the arguments for the counter-position".<sup>22</sup> And if the theses are to be taken as correct and the antitheses as false, it would be, "the death of sound philoso-

18 Ibid, p. 414.

19 Ibid., p. 357.

20 Ibid

21 Ibid, p. 425.

22 Ibid., p. 385.

phy”<sup>23</sup> Therefore Kant holds that we must regard both the theses and the antitheses as equally important, so that we may not be alleged of dogmatically asserting one position and denying the counter-position.

According to Kant, the theses and the antitheses arise out of the specific nature of reason and sensibility. The theses study something which is supersensible and the antitheses study what is sensible. This supersensible should not be confused with the sensible because the mode of knowing sensible reality is different from the way in which the supersensible is revealed.

Kant regards the unity between thesis and anti-thesis as cosmological idea, because it is a unity of the world as a whole. Since this unity is given by reason through the concepts of understanding, therefore, he arranges them in accordance with the table of categories.

Kant states that the idea of the world as a whole, that is to say, the cosmological idea of the category of quantity is the absolute totality which can be applied to time and space. Any given conditioned can be regarded only as preceded or conditioned by “past time”,<sup>24</sup> that has gone before it. When the present condition is given, all the past conditions are “thought as being given in its entirety”<sup>25</sup>. The past time constitutes a series of conditions leading to the present and can, therefore, yield an idea of the absolute totality of the conditions. But space, according to Kant, “does not in itself constitute a series”<sup>26</sup>. Nevertheless every conditioned can only be regarded as limited in space and therefore space also applies to the series of conditions. In this way time and space apply to absolute totality of the conditions. Kant calls it as “absolute completeness of the composition of the given whole of all appearances”.<sup>27</sup>

The cosmological idea of the category of quality is regarded

23 Ibid

24 Ibid , p 383

25 Ibid , p 388

26 Ibid

27 Ibid , p 390

by Kant as "reality in space".<sup>28</sup> The reality in space is always conditioned and its "internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of its parts its remote conditions"<sup>29</sup> Every conditioned reality has to be divided to the extent that "the reality of matter vanishes either into nothing or into what is no longer matter—namely, the simple".<sup>30</sup> Thus, in the division of conditions, there is "an advance to the unconditioned"<sup>31</sup> Kant calls it "Absolute completeness in the division of a given whole in the (field of) appearance"<sup>32</sup>

The cosmological idea of the category of relation is regarded by Kant as causality. Causality, "presents a series of causes of a given effect such that we can proceed to ascend from the latter as the conditioned to the former as conditions, and so to answer the question of reason"<sup>33</sup> The category of causality can be applied to a given condition or effect in order to find out a series of causes leading to that effect. In this way, the category of causality can be applied to an effect in order to find out the absolute totality of the effects. Kant calls it "Absolute completeness in the origination of an appearance"<sup>34</sup>

The cosmological idea of the category of modality is regarded by Kant as accident. Every "accidental in existence must always be regarded as conditioned, and as pointing in conformity with rule of the understanding to a condition under which it is necessary, and this later in turn to a higher condition, until reason finally attains unconditioned necessity in the totality of series."<sup>35</sup> Kant calls it as "Absolute completeness as regards dependence of existence of alterable in the (field) of appearance".<sup>36</sup>

Kant, thus, maintains that the division of categories lead to the four cosmological ideas demanding absolute totality con-

28 Ibid , p 389

29 Ibid

30 Ibid

31 Ibid

32 Ibid , p 390.

33 Ibid , pp. 389-90

34 Ibid , p. 390.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

cerning (i) composition, (ii) division, (iii) origination of appearance, and (iv) dependence of existence of the alterable in the field of appearances. All these ideas are related to appearances and not to things-in themselves. The four cosmological ideas are the four antinomies of pure reason.

In the context of the thesis and the antithesis of the first antinomy, it has to be noted that the world stands for anything which can be given in space and time. Both thesis and antithesis assume space and time as infinite. And the question that Kant asks is whether the things in space and time are finite or infinite? The thesis reads, "The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space"<sup>37</sup> Kant does not claim that the thesis can be established consistently. On the contrary, he states the opposite in the anti-thesis, i.e. "the world has no beginning in time, and no limits in space".<sup>38</sup> It is precisely in this that Kant finds the antinomy, the insoluble contradiction that the thesis is just as demonstrable as the antithesis. The thesis is demonstrable on the basis that if it is assumed that the world has no beginning in time, then "up to every given moment an eternity has elapsed".<sup>39</sup> And it is impossible to synthesize an infinite series of successive events. Therefore, it is necessary to assume that the world has a beginning in time. Similarly, if it is assumed that the world has no limit in space, then it is impossible to synthesize every successive part of an unlimited world. So the world must be regarded as limited in space.

Just as the thesis is demonstrable, similarly the antithesis can also be proved. The antithesis can be proved if it is assumed that the world has a beginning in time and a limit in space. Now the concept of beginning is possible only if there are empty space and time preceding it. But "no coming to be is possible in an empty time and space".<sup>40</sup> Therefore, the world must be regarded as infinite in time and unlimited as regards space.

37 *Ibid*, p 396

38 *Ibid*

39 *Ibid*

40 *Ibid*, pp 396-7

In this way both thesis and anti-thesis are proved only by refuting one with the other. But Kant finds an inconsistency in both the thesis and the antithesis because when it is said either that the world has beginning, or that it has no beginning, then it is implied that the world is given as a whole. Now if the world is thing-in-itself, then it is invalid to apply any category to it. But if the world consists of appearances, then again it is invalid to suppose that the series of appearances can be given in their entirety. Therefore Kant states that the conflict between thesis and antithesis is not real. It is the dialectical opposition in which both the alternatives are illusory. The world as a whole, for Kant, is only an idea and it can never be presented in reality.

In the context of the second antinomy, it has to be noted that both thesis and antithesis assume space as "infinitely divisible"<sup>41</sup>. The question is whether things in space can be divided infinitely or not? The thesis reads, "Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is composed of the simple"<sup>42</sup>. It is argued that every composite substance can be divided to the extent that it cannot further be divided, and it is called by Kant as simple. On that basis, it is maintained that every composite substance in the world is made up of the simple. But, the antithesis maintains, "No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple"<sup>43</sup>. In this context, it is argued that no composite substance can be regarded as made up of simple parts, because every simple part occupies space which is infinitely divisible. Therefore every simple part can possibly be further divided. Consequently, there is nothing simple but only what is a composite substance.

In the case of the second antinomy, Kant states that both the alternatives, i.e. thesis and antithesis, are not real. When it is said either that the world is composed of simples or that it

41 A C Ewing . *A Short Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* p. 214

42 Kant . *Critique of Pure Reason*, p 402.

43 Ibid

does not, both thesis and antithesis are not real, because they imply that the world is given as an infinite whole. But the world as a whole cannot be given in reality. Therefore, both thesis and anti-thesis are illusory. For Kant, it is only a dialectical opposition in which both the alternatives are illusory.

However, in the case of third antinomy, Kant does not reject either of the alternatives. On the contrary, both can be regarded as true. The thesis is true because it applies to things-in-themselves and the antithesis is true because it applies to the appearances. Since Kant maintains that no knowledge is possible without a thing given in appearance and no appearance is possible without the thing-in-itself, therefore both the appearances and the thing-in-itself are true. On this basis Kant uses causality, in the third antinomy in two different aspects, one of which supports the thesis and the other supports the antithesis. In the thesis, there is a free causality which is not caused by anything else while everything is caused by it. The thesis says, "Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom"<sup>44</sup>. It is argued that in the field of appearances, every event is caused by a preceding event, and that in turn by another preceding event, and so on. But there must be a first cause in order to regard a beginning of the events. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a free causality which is not caused by anything else. Kant states that it is the thing-in-itself which is not caused by anything else while everything is caused by it.

But in the antithesis Kant states, "There is no freedom, everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature"<sup>45</sup>. Here it is argued that everything in nature is determined by the law of cause-effect relationship. In the sensible world, whatever happens, has a cause which precedes it in time and cause itself happens in time, consequently it requires a cause preceding it. Therefore, there is an endless

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 409.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

causal chain which cannot be completed and it is impossible to conceive a free causality. On this basis, Kant attempts to show that there is no freedom in the sensible world.

Kant, in this way, maintains that in the third antinomy both thesis and antithesis are true because the former applies to thing-in-itself and the latter to the appearance. But the free-causality can never be presented in reality. Therefore, Kant regards it only as an idea.

In the thesis of the fourth antinomy, Kant says, "There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary."<sup>46</sup> It is argued that whatever is conditioned requires the unconditioned for its complete explanation. The unconditioned must be antecedent to what is conditioned in time. Therefore the unconditioned must belong to the same temporal world where conditions exist. And the antithesis states, "An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause."<sup>47</sup> Here it is argued that if there exists an absolutely necessary being from which a series of contingent events originate, then it would be self-contradictory because it (necessary being) cannot be necessary, if its parts are contingent. Further if it is assumed that a necessary being exists outside the world and is the cause of the events, then it must act in time and for acting in time it must exist in the world. But it goes against the proposition that a necessary being exists outside the world. Therefore, a necessary being can exist neither in the world, nor outside the world.

Kant states that the conflict between thesis and antithesis is a dialectical opposition in which both the alternatives are illusory. The unconditioned necessary being, according to Kant, can never be presented in reality and must, therefore, be regarded as an idea.

Kant, in this way, propounds four antinomies in four cosmological ideas. He, however, does not show any relationship among the theses, on the one hand, and the antitheses, on the other, of the antinomies. Nevertheless, the theses of the

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 415

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*



antinomies share a common feature—they regard and in fact demand that the absolute totality, i.e. the unconditioned, is something which can never be given in sensible intuitions. On the other hand, the antitheses maintain that the only reality is what can be given in sensible intuition beyond which there is nothing. But theses and antitheses, according to Kant, are opposed to one another and they do not share any common feature. And the whole attempt of Kant lies in showing that concepts like finite and infinite, simple and complex, conditioned and unconditioned are opposed to one another in such a way that the one excludes the other. These are such questions which, reason can neither answer, nor can it negate them; because such a conflict is grounded in the nature of reason itself. Kant maintains that the antinomies raise certain unavoidable contradictions which are rooted in reason as an illusion.

The transcendental illusion of the antinomies in Kant gives rise to the development of Hegel's dialectics. The transcendental illusion, which Kant stipulates, is, in fact, for Hegel, the appearance of the real, that is to say, a cleavage between subjective spirit and objective spirit. Hegel appreciates Kantian dialectics in so far as it regards a dialectical character of reason. But he vehemently criticizes Kantian dialectics in so far as it is regarded by Kant as a logic of illusion in which "its entire strength existed in the possibility that conceals 'contradictions' and this did not earn 'naturally any great praise' " <sup>48</sup>

According to Hegel, Kant's dialectics is defective because in it infinite and finite, unconditioned and conditioned, identity and difference are opposed to each other in such a way that the one excludes the other. But Hegel states that every entity is identical with itself and by virtue of its self-identity, it is different from all other entities and, "in order to identify anything, we must distinguish it from everything else" <sup>49</sup> Therefore,

48 G.W.F. Hegel's *Saemtliche Works*, edited by H. Grouhner, Stuttgart, 1927-28, vol. p. 54, trans. by P. Talgeri in an unpublished paper on "The Dialectics of Hegel".

49 Stanley Rosen. G.W.F. Hegel—*An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*, p. 117.

"Identify and difference are inseparable but distinguishable features of opposition as the general characteristic of positing, or the manifesting of appearance, a positing which is, as such, a self-negation"<sup>50</sup> According to Hegel.

"Reality has within it the principle of self-movement. An entity maintains itself by overcoming and incorporating the manifold of external elements it experiences and bringing opposite elements into an internal harmony. The being of a thing is the entire dynamic of its becoming something else and unifying itself with its other. Something can be known only by knowing its development—its history. It is this movement or force which constitutes the reality of an entity."<sup>51</sup>

On this basis, Hegel criticizes Kant's dialectics which is used only as a negative method in order to expose transcendental illusions. Hegel, as opposed to Kant, uses dialectics not only as a negative method but also as a positive method, so that a phenomenon can be known in its entirety. The absolute totality of conditions which is a transcendental illusion in Kant's dialectics becomes the starting point of Hegelian dialectics. Hegel attempts to comprehend absolute totality in all its fractional parts and sub-parts. His dialectics revolves around the basic concept of absolute spirit which is always in the dialectical process of self-development and self-realization.

This absolute spirit is infinite which actualizes itself only by negating itself. Hegel writes, "...the infinite actualizes itself only in positing itself as finite. This doctrine might be described both as concrete transcendence and as a concrete immanence, because while in creating the finite the infinite transcends it, still what is so created is the realization of what is implicit in the infinite and so is in a sense immanent in it"<sup>52</sup> Hegel states that infinite and finite are related to each other in as much as they are opposed to each other. "They are not like the factors of a number, indifferent to one another, but are related organically. A process is intelligible only in the light of its result

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 120-1.

<sup>51</sup> Norman D. Liverhood: *Activity in Marx's Philosophy*, p. 4.

<sup>52</sup> Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Tr. with notes by T. M. Knox, Oxford University Press, London 1967, p. 310.

and to this result every moment in the process contributes, since each moment is the making explicit of what was present in the germ at start.”<sup>53</sup>

In this way, unlike Kant, both finite and infinite are organically related because “identity and difference are identical-within-difference”<sup>54</sup> In Hegel’s analysis, “. .the dialectical motion from identity via difference to contradiction will be shown to correspond to pure essence externalizing or ‘appearing’ as a determinate moment (position) which, as opposed to essence, is both positive (self-identical) and negative (different from essence). But, as self-identical, the positive moment is precisely a moment of negativity, but as negative, or different from essence it is the same as, and in this sense ‘returns to’ essence. The opposition of position and negation expresses itself as it returns into its ground”<sup>55</sup>

The determinate moment or the position of an entity, through which the entity maintains its self-identity, is what Hegel calls quality<sup>56</sup> And since the position of an entity is both positive (self-identical) and negative (different from essence), so quality is not only positive but also negative<sup>57</sup> In Hegel’s analysis, quality is that through which an entity maintains its self-identity which is possible only when the entity distinguishes itself from other entities. The moments of identity and difference are called by Hegel as attraction and repulsion and the “unity of attraction and repulsion is quantity”<sup>58</sup> Repulsion and attraction, according to Hegel, are the same as the many and the one respectively “Repulsion is the moment of separation and difference, and is thus the principle of many. Attraction is relation-to-self, the moment of identity, and is thus the principle of the one”<sup>59</sup> Therefore

53 Ibid, p. 311.

54 Stanley Rosen . G.W.F. Hegel—*Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*, p 116.

55 Ibid., p. 115.

56 W T Stace *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 140.

57 Ibid., p. 151

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid, p. 155.

quantity is the unity of the many and the one. Quantity, according to Hegel, is related to quality in such a way that the one passes into the other and thus constitutes the unity of self-identity and self-difference. This is a kind of dialectical process which is operating in every entity and it starts operating when the spirit posits itself in its otherness.

Further the position of spirit is regarded by Hegel as its negation which has its constant struggle with that which posits itself. The struggle between position and negation is resolved by reason which gives them the unity. The unity and the struggle between position and negation is a kind of dialectical movement which is operating in every entity. The position and negation cease to be opposed to each other, when the spirit regards the negativity as a part of its own unity. The negativity, according to Hegel, is not only negated by the spirit, but also it is assimilated by the spirit. Hegel calls it as the negation of the negation.

In this way, Hegelian dialectics comprehends all the contradictory moments and reconciles them with reason which gives their reality in their unity. Such a unity cannot be grasped by understanding which makes its object the antithesis between the finite and the infinite. The difference between Hegel's and Kant's meaning of the terms understanding and reason has been discussed in the first chapter. In Hegel's analysis, the unity between contradictory moments is created by reason and the reality is only that unity. On this basis, he identifies reason with reality. The absolute unconditioned, which for Kant is an idea of reason and where Kant attempts to curb the expanse of reason by preventing its pretension from presenting the unconditioned in reality, becomes the starting point of Hegelian dialectics and is realized by reason in its various phases of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

Marx and Engels appreciate Hegel's dialectics because it attempts to comprehend a being in the entire dynamic of its becoming something else and unifying itself with its other and thus bringing all opposing elements into internal harmony. But Marx differs from Hegel on the ground that the dialectical laws, which operate in Hegelian philosophy, are not the dialectical laws of the objects. Since, for Hegel, object gets its

objectivity from the spirit, being an externalization of it, so the dialectics, which operates in the objects, is the dialectics of the spirit. Criticizing Hegel's dialectics Marx holds, "Hegel's dialectical principles were abstracted from facts. It is in material reality, not thought, that dialectical laws evolve and are discovered."<sup>60</sup> According to Marx, Hegel is wrong in recognizing spirit as the source of dialectics. In other words, Hegel is wrong in saying that the self development of spirit is the real development of objects because objects are an-othering of the spirit. Marx rejects Hegel's stress on the ontological primacy of the spirit and consequently his confinement within idealism.

Nevertheless Marx relies on Hegel for the form of dialectics, but he does so in such a way that he has transformed Hegel's dialectics. For Marx, "the dialectical movement is merely a reflection of the actual development of the real world".<sup>61</sup>

Engels maintains that there are mainly three laws of dialectics which are as follows :

"The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice-versa ; the law of the interpenetration of opposites ; the law of the negation of the negation".<sup>62</sup>

These three laws are incorporated by Engels from Hegel. But whereas these laws "are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought"<sup>63</sup> Engels points out that these laws have their materialist basis. He says :

"Dialectics, so called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which assert itself everywhere in nature and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature"<sup>64</sup>

From this perspective Kantian antinomies can be regarded

60 Norman D. Livergood · *Activity in Marx's Philosophy*, p. 5.

61 Ibid

62 Engels *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 62.

63 Ibid

64 Ibid p 211.

as resolved. It is precisely because the first antinomy concerning the question—whether the world has a beginning in time and a limit in space, or not—gets resolved if space and time are regarded as the basic forms of the existence of matter in motion and outside matter in motion they are nothing. Similarly the second antinomy concerning—whether substances are composed of simples or not—is also solved if it is regarded that every individual substance is related to innumerable substances in such a way that one cannot exist without the other. In the same way the third antinomy concerning causality and freedom is also resolved on the basis that every material entity is causally interconnected and the cause of the change in any material entity lies primarily within itself. With the knowledge of the causal relations in objective reality, man can change it and thus realizes freedom. On this basis, the concepts, which are antinomous in Kant, are resolved consistently in the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels.

Nevertheless, Kant's significant contribution lies in his attempt to show certain antinomies involved in human reason itself. These give rise to an era of dialectical thinking. Kant states that antinomies arise due to the search for the unconditioned which can never be given in reality. Therefore, he regards it as an idea of reason. Kant maintains that there are three ideas of reason, namely, immortality of soul, freedom of the will and existence of God. They are unconditioned, transcendent and noumenal for Kant. They can never be given in reality. But they constitute the postulates of moral laws in Kant.

## Paralogisms and Ideas of Reason

It has been seen in the last chapter that reason, according to Kant, is not satisfied with the series of conditions and seeks to get the unconditioned but fails to present the unconditioned in reality. So the concept of the unconditioned is regarded by him as an idea. The ideas of reason are different from the categories of understanding because the latter have their validity for an object given in sensible intuition, whereas the former have no such application. Therefore the ideas of reason are transcendent and a-logical. They constitute the realm of spiritual wherein lies the basis of Kant's moral laws.

Kant maintains that there are three ideas of reason, namely, immortality of the soul, freedom of the will and existence of God. They are regarded by him as the necessary conditions of moral laws. Hence they are called by Kant as postulates of moral laws.

Freedom of the will will be taken up for discussion later on in the chapter entitled "Kant's views on Morality", because all the moral laws, in Kant's view, are derived from it whereas immortality of the soul and existence of God are required, not for the possibility of the moral laws, but for their adequate fulfilment. Therefore here I shall dwell upon immortality of soul and existence of God. In the context of the immortality of soul,

Kant tries to show that it cannot be conceived within the sphere of epistemology. And if the categories of understanding are applied to it, there arise paralogisms. In the sphere of epistemology, Kant regards the soul as transcendental, but in the sphere of morality, it is regarded as transcendent. Therefore, it is necessary to first discuss the transcendental soul and then analyse the immortality of the soul.

The common structure of soul, Kant designates as "transcendental unity of self-consciousness".<sup>1</sup> It consists of the forms of intuition and forms of understanding, which, for Kant, are not static but forms of operation that exist only in the act of apprehending and comprehending sensible intuitions. The forms of intuition synthesize the manifold of sensible intuitions into spatio-temporal order. By virtue of the categories, the results of the spatio-temporal order are brought to universal and necessary relations of cause and effect, substance, reciprocity, and so on. And this entire complex is unified in the transcendental apperception which relates all experience to the thinking ego, thereby giving experience the continuity of being 'my' experience.

What Kant calls the highest synthesis, that of transcendental apperception, is the awareness of 'I think' which accompanies every representation. He says, "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me".<sup>2</sup> The 'I think' can be regarded as continuous, active and present in the series of representations only if they are given in a unity with one another through it. "That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin the representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it

1 Kant - *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 153

2 Ibid, pp. 152-3



possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations".<sup>3</sup>

Kant, in this way, concludes that the awareness of an 'I think' or the transcendental apperception is the ultimate basis for the unity of the subject and, hence, for the universality and necessity of all the objective relations. The awareness of an 'I think' according to Kant, "cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation",<sup>4</sup> because "The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge".<sup>5</sup>

Kant states that 'I think' is the "vehicle of all concepts, and therefore also of transcendental concepts, and so is always included in conceiving of these latter, and is itself transcendental".<sup>6</sup> 'I' as a thinking being signifies "the 'rational doctrine of the soul', in as much as I am not here seeking to learn in regard to the soul anything more than can be inferred, independently of all experience, from this concept 'I' so far as it is present in all thought".<sup>7</sup>

In Kant's view, 'I think' is the logical presupposition of all knowledge and it is the final condition of every act of knowledge. But 'I think', or the transcendental consciousness can never be given in sensible intuition. And if categories of understanding are applied to it, then there arises paralogism, by which Kant means "a formally invalid conclusion."<sup>8</sup> The judgement 'I think', according to Kant, contains no knowledge of the 'I'. The fallacy arises when certain conclusions are drawn from 'I think', namely (i) that the soul is substance (ii) that it is simple, (iii) that it is a person, (iv) that it is in relation to possible objects in space. Out of these four paralogisms, the first three are discussed by Kant with the same arguments that the categories of substance, simple and person can never be applied to the judgement 'I think'. On this basis, Kant, while

3 Ibid, p 153.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid, p 154

6 Ibid, p 329.

7 Ibid, p. 328

8 Ibid.

accepting Cartesian premise that 'I' is the thinking ego, rejects Descartes' claim that 'I think' is a substance. The fourth paralogism is concerned with the relation of the objects to the soul. Here Kant tries to refute the subjective idealism of Berkeley and tries to justify his transcendental idealism. In the first paralogism Kant says "That which is the absolute subject of our judgements, is substance. I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject. Therefore, I, as thinking being (soul), am substance."<sup>9</sup>

Kant states that there is a fallacy involved in the judgement given above. The category of substance can be applied to "an object given in experience as permanent".<sup>10</sup> But in the above judgement, "we have not taken as our basis any experience. the inference is merely from the concept of the relation which all thought has to the 'I' as the common subject in which it inheres. Nor should we, in resting it upon experience, be able, by any sure observation, to demonstrate such permanence. The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least trace of intuition, distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition"<sup>11</sup> Kant holds that the soul as a thinker is always a subject because it is that which thinks and hence it cannot be predicated of anything. But from the fact that soul is a subject, it does not follow that it is also a permanent substance. The category of substance can be applied to an object which can be given in sensible intuition and soul, as thinking being, cannot be given in sensible intuition. On this basis, Kant maintains that it is an invalid conclusion that the soul is a permanent substance.

In the second paralogism, Kant states, "That, the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is simple.

"Now the soul, or the thinking 'I', is such a being"<sup>12</sup>

Therefore Kant holds that the 'I' is a simple substance because the action, which form the 'I' is not a concurrence of

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 333.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 334.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 335.

several things. But, "Every composite substance is an aggregate of several substances, and the action of a composite, or whatever inheres in it as thus composite, is an aggregate of actions of accidents, distributed among the plurality of the substances"<sup>13</sup> But the soul is a simple substance and its simplicity is, "already involved in every thought".<sup>14</sup> Therefore Kant considers the proposition "soul is simple", as an analytic proposition. But nothing can be derived from an analytic proposition. It is, therefore, a mistake to prove the soul, as a simple substance from the simplicity of the soul. The soul can never be given in "sensible intuition, hence it cannot be regarded as a simple substance. It means that the simplicity of the soul is not a knowledge of the simplicity of soul. The second paralogism, according to Kant, erroneously argues from the logical unity of the soul to the actual simplicity of the soul.

In the third paralogism, Kant says: "That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times is in so far a person. Now the soul is conscious, etc. Therefore, it is a person."<sup>15</sup>

Kant's criticism of the third paralogism concerning personality is exactly like the criticism of the preceding two paralogisms. The fallacy is due to a confusion between the logical and the actual identity of the soul. The self-identity of the soul throughout all its experiences, is only a logical identity and not at all a real identity. This is what is expressed by the proposition 'I think'. But from the logical identity of the soul, according to Kant, one cannot deduce the real identity of the underlying soul, because it cannot be given in sensible intuition. Therefore, the third paralogism is an invalid conclusion.

In the fourth paralogism, Kant says, "That the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perception, has a merely doubtful existence.

Now all outer appearances are of such a nature that their existence is not immediately perceived, and that we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid, p. 334.

15 Ibid. p. 335.

"Therefore the existence of all objects of the outer senses is doubtful"<sup>16</sup>

This paralogism is concerned more with the nature of the objects of perception than with the soul. Kant argues that, if it is maintained that "only what is in ourselves can be perceived immediately, and that my own existence is the sole object of a mere perception",<sup>17</sup> then what we directly perceive is 'self' and its states, and the external objects, falling altogether outside the self cannot be directly perceived and can only be inferred from our perceptions. But such an inference can give us no knowledge of objects external to us, because we cannot determine whether the cause of our perception lies within us or outside us. Therefore the existence of external objects may be doubtful. This uncertainty is called the ideality of appearances and the doctrine which maintains this is called by Kant as idealism.

In exposing the fallacy in this argument, Kant offers a refutation of idealism. He states that the external objects are empirically real and they have their existence only in appearance. As things-in-themselves are unknown and unknowable, we can know the external objects, not as they are in-themselves, but as they appear to us. Thus what Kant refutes is not idealism as such, but only the subjective idealism of Berkeley who maintains that objects exist only because they are perceived either by a finite spirit or by an infinite spirit. Against the subjective idealism of Berkeley, Kant supports empirical realism in that he grants the undoubted existence of things as appearance. As opposed to Berkeley's subjective idealism, Kant maintains a transcendental idealism according to which even outer appearances are mere representations which exist in us. But if they exist in us, how can we call them as outer? Kant states that they are outer only in the sense that they consist of representations which relate their objects in space, in which all things are external to one another. But since space itself is in us, so the outer appearances are not transcendently outside us but only

<sup>16</sup> Ibid , p. 344.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

empirically outside us. Kant, in this way, attempts to show the invalidity of the fourth paralogism.

From the above account, it follows that within the sphere of epistemology, according to Kant, the soul can be regarded neither as a permanent substance nor as simple nor as real but only as a logical subject which is presupposed in every act of cognition. In Kant's analysis, within the sphere of epistemology, the soul cannot be regarded as immortal.

But moral laws, according to Kant, presuppose the immortality of the soul, because they are supposed to promote the highest good which is the object of the rational will. During the course of our discussion it will be shown that the concept of highest good is identical with God in Kant. The rational will can attain the highest good only if it is in complete fitness to the moral laws and this requires an endless progress towards that end.

"The achievement of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of will determinable by the moral law. In such a will, however, the complete fitness of intentions to the moral law is the supreme condition of the highest good. This fitness, therefore, must be just as possible as its object, because it is contained in the command that requires us to promote the latter. But complete fitness of the will to the moral law is holiness, which is a perfection of which no rational being in the world of sense is at any time capable. But since it is required as practically necessary, it can be found only in an endless progress to that complete fitness..."<sup>18</sup> On this basis, he says: "This infinite progress is possible, however, only under the presupposition of an infinitely enduring existence and personality of the same rational being; this is called the immortality of the soul"<sup>19</sup>.

Kant holds that moral laws can adequately be fulfilled only if the soul can be regarded as immortal. Being a "necessary condition for obedience"<sup>20</sup> to the moral laws, the immortality of

18 Kant: *Critique of Practical Reason*, Tr. by Lewis White Beck, A Liberal Arts Press Book, New York, pp 126-7.

19 Ibid, p 127

20 Ibid, p 137.

the soul is regarded by Kant as a postulate<sup>21</sup> of the moral laws. He says, "The first (immortality of the soul) derives from the practically necessary condition of duration adequate to the perfect fulfilment of the moral laws"<sup>22</sup>

Thus moral laws presuppose that the soul must be immortal, so that it can attain the highest good which moral laws are supposed to promote. In Kant's analysis, the highest good can be obtained only if the soul is immortal, so that it can continuously endeavour towards that end. And the soul can be regarded as immortal only from the moral point of view and not from the epistemological standpoint.

For Kant, the highest good for which moral laws require immortality of the soul, is identical with the existence of God. He uses the word 'God' in two different senses, namely, in sphere of morality, he identifies God with the concept of highest good, and while refuting the arguments given by the theologians, he uses the expression God in the usual theological sense. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss Kant's concept of God as it is maintained by him in the sphere of morality, and then analyse and examine his refutation of the arguments given by the theologians to prove the existence of God.

In the sphere of morality, Kant identifies the concept of highest good with the existence of God and his argument for this is that the existence of God arises "from the necessary condition of such an intelligible world by which it may be the highest good, through the presupposition of the highest independent good, i.e. the existence of God"<sup>23</sup>. In his analysis, moral laws promote the highest good or God only if the highest good or God is attainable in principle. He states that it is from the point of view of morality that the highest good or the existence of God can be conceived: "It was the moral ideas that gave rise to the concept of the divine being, which we know hold to be correct... because it completely harmonises with moral principles of reason"<sup>24</sup>. In Kant's view, the existence of God

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 643.

can be conceived only if it is regarded as a necessary condition of the moral laws. Therefore he regards the existence of God as a postulate of moral laws.

Kant does not accept the arguments given by the theologians for the existence of God. He holds that there are only three arguments through which the existence of God may be sought to have been proved in theology, namely ontological, cosmological and physico-theological. Kant attempts to bring out the contradictions involved in these arguments. In the following analysis, Kant's refutation of the ontological argument will be discussed separately and the cosmological and the physico-theological arguments together, because the latter two are refuted by him in a similar way.

Kant, first, analyses and refutes the ontological argument. As a matter of fact, this argument can be traced back to medieval St Anselm (1033-1109) when he argues from an idea of a perfect being to the existence of such a being.

According to St Anselm, "It is obviously assumed as a fact that there are degrees of perfection in the universe, degrees of goodness for example. It is further assumed as a premise that when a number of beings possess a perfection which does not of itself involve finiteness and limitation, they derive this perfection from a being which is that perfection itself in an absolute and unlimited form. Thus degrees of goodness reveal the existence of absolute goodness, degrees of wisdom the existence of absolute or infinite wisdom, and so on"<sup>25</sup> On this basis, he states that the idea of absolutely perfect being implies the existence of that Being, i.e., God.

This argument is also advocated by Descartes who writes, "I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can it having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a (rectilinear) triangle"<sup>26</sup> He states that God is perfect and existence is a perfection, therefore God exists. Leibniz also holds this

25 F.C. Copleston - *A History of Medieval Philosophy*, Methuen & Co. Ltd. London, 1980, p. 73

26 Descartes - *The Philosophical Works*, Tr. by E.S. Haldane & G.R. Rose, Cambridge University Press, London, 1967, p. 181.

argument on the basis of the distinction between existence and essence with the assumption that essence can make the possibility of existence. Leibniz writes, "For, if there is a reality in essence or possibilities, or indeed in eternal truths, this reality must be founded on something existent and actual, and consequently on the existence of the necessary being in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to be possible is itself to be actual" <sup>27</sup>

Kant analyses the ontological argument in the following manner :

1. God, by definition, is the sum-total of all positive predicates.
2. Existence is a positive predicate.
3. Therefore, God exists

Kant challenges the validity of the second premise, i.e. "existence is a positive predicate". He argues : "Being is obviously not a real predicate, that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations as existing in themselves. Logically it is merely the copula of a judgement".<sup>28</sup> The concept of a thing, according to Kant, is not going to gain or lose anything by either adding or subtracting existence. Kant says, "... the real contains no more than merely the possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers" <sup>29</sup>

Kant points out that there is a confusion involved in the view that a necessary being is logically necessary, so that it cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Accordingly to Kant to say that a judgement is unconditionally necessary, is not to say whether the subject or the predicate is so. The predicate is only conditionally necessary, that is to say, conditionally on the subject. And if the subject is removed, there will be no necessity in the predicate. Kant illustrates this point by an ex-

<sup>27</sup> Leibniz · *Philosophical Writings*, p. 10.

<sup>28</sup> Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 504.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.



ample. It is a necessary judgement that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. This judgement cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Kant says, "If I reject the predicate while retaining the subject, contradiction results, and I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction, for nothing is then left that can be contradicted. To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of a absolutely necessary being" <sup>30</sup>

Kant, thus, concludes that there is a contradiction in maintaining a necessity in the predicate without the subject, but there is no contradiction in rejecting both the subject and the predicate alike. There is a contradiction in maintaining the idea of God and rejecting its existence. But there is no contradiction in rejecting both the idea and the existence of God together. There may be no such being as God.

Kant, in this way, brings out the inconsistencies involved in the ontological argument. Kant states that ontological argument is the basis of the cosmological and the physico-theological argument which are established on the ground that everything in the world is finite and limited, and has a cause which in turn had a cause and so on. It is further maintained in these arguments that the series of causes cannot be infinite and the first term in the series must be uncaused and that is God. Cosmological argument was first used by Aristotle who argued that a given motion in the universe is produced by some other motion, this motion by a third and so on; and since an infinite regress is impossible, so it is necessary to assume the existence of "an unmoved First Mover or God".<sup>31</sup> This argument is further advocated by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74). He argues on the same Aristotelean assumption, that is, from the movement of things to the "existence of a supreme

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 502.

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle *Ethics*, p. 358.

unmoved mover".<sup>32</sup> And this is regarded by him as God, Descartes also argues that men know that they are imperfect, yet in their minds an idea of supreme perfection continues. He states cause must contain as much reality as its effect and thus he concludes that the cause of the idea of supreme perfection must be a perfect being or God

This argument is further advocated by Locke and Berkeley. Locke argues that everything is in motion, but motion is not an inherent property of material things. He states that motion is introduced to material things through something foreign to it and that must be God. Berkeley argues that God is the ultimate cause of the universe and things exist because they are eternally being perceived by an infinite spirit or God.

Kant attempts to bring out contradictions involved in cosmo-physico theological arguments. He states that the argument starts from the experience of finitude and limitation, but soon after that it "abandons experience altogether, and endeavours to discover from the mere concept what properties an absolutely necessary being must have. it is evident that we are here presupposing that the concept of the highest reality is completely adequate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence, that is, that the latter can be inferred from the former"<sup>33</sup> Now this is the proposition, according to Kant, maintained in the ontological argument where necessity in the predicate is derived from the subject. Since he has shown the invalidity of the ontological argument, so he concludes that cosmo-physicotheological arguments which depend on ontological argument, must also, consequently, equally be rejected.

Kant, thus, shows that the existence of God cannot be proved from the arguments like ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological through which the theologians have tried to prove it. But for Kant, "... it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God"<sup>34</sup> In the sphere of morality, he regards the existence of God as identical with the concept of highest good which moral laws are supposed to promote.

32 F. C. Copleston *A History of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 193.

33 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 509

34 Kant *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 130.

Therefore, the concept of highest good or God is regarded by Kant as a postulate of moral laws.

To sum up, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are two out of the three postulates of Kant's moral laws. The former is required for the adequate fulfilment of moral laws and this fulfilment consists of attaining the highest good which is identical with the existence of God. The concept of highest good or God can be attained only if the soul is immortal. Thus for Kant, immortality of the soul is dependent upon the existence of God because the former depends upon its continuous endeavour towards attaining the highest good or god. He holds that immortality of the soul and existence of God are transcendent and noumenal and they can never be given in the sphere of epistemology. They are unconditioned and ideas of reason. Being only ideas, they constitute the idealist aspect of Kant's ontology.

## Kant's Views on Morality

Kant's views on morality can only be discussed in the light of his epistemology and ontology. As discussed in the first chapter he makes a fundamental distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. The sphere of epistemology, according to Kant, is confined to the sphere of phenomenon. But the sphere of noumenon transcends the validity of scientific knowledge. It constitutes the realm of spiritual and hence manifests the aspect of idealism in Kant's philosophy. He conceives the basis of moral laws in the sphere of noumenon in which the categories of scientific cognition have no applicability. On this basis, Kant draws an unbridgeable gulf between epistemology and morality, between the is and the ought.

In Kant, there is, however, a distinction as well as a relation between moral laws and moral actions. For him, the source of the moral laws lies in the noumenal world, whereas moral actions are performed in the phenomenal world. In Kant's analysis, the criterion for judging an action, whether it is morally good or not, lies in the noumenal world. The sphere of noumenon is regarded as the sphere of three ideas of reason, namely, immortality of the soul, freedom and of the will and existence of God. The question of the knowledge of these

ideas of reason does not arise. But they are regarded by Kant as postulates of morality

Kant's views on morality can be interpreted within the framework of idealism. This is so, because he derives moral laws from the realm of spiritual (the noumenal). He makes a fundamental distinction between phenomenal world and noumenal world. In the former our knowledge is confined to the laws "in accordance with which everything happens"<sup>1</sup>. It provides the knowledge of what is not at all a thing as it is in-itself, but a thing as the unity of apperception knows it through the forms of intuition and categories of understanding, and thus gives the knowledge of "what is, what has been, or what will be"<sup>2</sup>. In the phenomenal world, every effect is possible only in conformity to its cause. And since all events obey immutable laws, so actions performed on the basis of the knowledge of phenomenal world are regarded by Kant as necessary actions.

On this basis, Kant states that it is logically impossible to conceive freedom in the phenomenal world. But morality presupposes freedom, because a person can be held responsible for his moral actions, qua moral, only if he can do something about the way his decisions go. Therefore man's action as it ought to be presupposes freedom, that is, an exemption from causal determinism. Kant states that when one realizes what has happened ought not to have happened and what has not happened, ought to have happened, then one has to transcend the phenomenal world because the concept of ought cannot be derived from the phenomenal world. This is expressed by Kant in the following words :

"'Ought' expresses a kind of necessity and of connection which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature. We cannot say that anything in nature ought to be other than what in all these time-relations it actually is. When we have the

1 H J Paton *The Moral Law Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 53

2 Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, p 473.

course of nature alone in view, 'ought' has no meaning whatsoever."<sup>3</sup>

On this basis, he says

"This 'ought' expresses a possible action the ground of which cannot be anything but mere concept ; whereas in the case of mere natural action the ground must always be an appearance."<sup>4</sup>

Kant, thus, draws a fundamental distinction between the ought and the is. It constitutes a landmark in the history of the development of moral philosophy. In his analysis, the laws of the actions, as they ought to be, cannot be derived from the laws of the phenomenal world in which there is no freedom. To posit freedom, Kant conceives a noumenal world or an intelligible world

But moral actions, that is to say, actions as they ought to be, have to be performed in the phenomenal world. In this context Kant states that the phenomenal world cannot determine the goodness or badness of moral actions because the occurrence of the results in the phenomenal world are beyond man's freedom. Thus, for Kant, it is the willing and not the consequences on which morality of actions can be judged.

Kant says :

"The action to which 'ought' applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions. These conditions, however, do not play any part in determining the will itself, but only in determining the effect and its consequences in the field of appearances."<sup>5</sup>

Thus moral laws, according to Kant, cannot be derived from the laws of the phenomenal world, but from the noumenal world. Man belongs to both the worlds—phenomenal and noumenal, because as a conscious willing being, he belongs to the noumenal world, but as an agent performing the moral actions, he belongs to the phenomenal world. In other words, a man derives moral laws from the noumenal world and then acts in accordance with those laws in the phenomenal world

3 Ibid., pp 472-3.

4 Ibid. 473

5 Ibid

In so far as he belongs to the noumenal world, he is regarded by Kant as a rational being. And the will of every rational being is rational will. Kant defines will as, "a kind of causality (a power of causal action) belonging to living beings so far as they are rational."<sup>6</sup> The power of causal action, which belongs to the will of a rational being, is not the kind of causal action which belongs to the phenomenal world. As explained earlier causality in the phenomenal world, in Kant's analysis, is introduced by the a priori activity of human mind. But the power of causal action which belongs to a rational will is not imposed by something other than itself, that is to say, "it can act causally without being caused to do so by something other than itself"<sup>7</sup> Kant, in this way, maintains two types of causality, viz one is applicable to the phenomenal world, and the other belongs to the will.

The causal action which belongs to the will is possible only if it is free, because as "a rational being, man can never conceive the causality of his own will except under the idea of freedom, for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what reason must always attribute to itself) is to be free".<sup>8</sup> The idea of freedom is also regarded by Kant as a kind of causality, but it is not the kind of causality which is found in the phenomenal world. The "idea of freedom" is "a special kind",<sup>9</sup> of causality by which he means that it is "not lawless"<sup>10</sup> It must, therefore, have certain laws. But the laws of freedom are self-imposed laws for Kant. Freedom lies in obeying self-imposed laws. Freedom, thus, belongs to the rational will because it is the rational will that is free. Therefore, the laws of freedom and the laws of the rational will are one and the same. And since these laws are self-imposed, they express autonomy of the will. In this way freedom of will, rational will and autonomy of will, in Kant, are identical concepts. He says : "...a free-will would act under

<sup>6</sup> H J. Paton · *The Moral Law*, p 39.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid , p 113.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid , p 107

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

laws, but that these laws could not be imposed on it by something other than itself, for, if they were, they would merely be laws of natural necessity. If the laws of freedom cannot be other-imposed they must be self-imposed. That is to say, freedom would be identical with autonomy. .”<sup>11</sup>

Since freedom and autonomy belong to the rational will and rational will is possible in the noumenal world, so it may be interpreted that in the noumenal world, freedom and autonomy terminate in reason in order to enter into the process of being made real. On this basis it may be said that Kant's moral laws are possible in the noumenal world and it is reason which gives laws in accordance with which one ought to act. Thus Kant's notion of reason becomes the ultimate source of his moral laws. Such laws “cannot be based on sensuous experience”,<sup>12</sup> because sensibility can give rise to only what is contingent and probable. Moral laws must be “a priori”<sup>13</sup> and derived from reason because reason alone can rise above the particular, the contingent, the individual and can provide universal forms.

In this context, Kant's position is different from that of Hume. Hume regards reason as passive and morality as active. “Reason”, Hume says, “is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact”.<sup>14</sup> But for Hume there are certain things which are not susceptible of any such agreement and disagreement, and they will be, “inacceptable of being true or false, and can never be an object of reason”<sup>15</sup>. He says, “it is evident our passions, volitions and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement, being original facts and realities, complete in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions and actions. It is impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or

11 Ibid, p. 39

12 Ibid, p. 14.

13 Ibid, p. 113.

14 David Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature* : Book 2 and 3, by ed. Paul S. Ardal, Fortanan/Collins 1978, p. 193.

15 Ibid



false and be either contrary or conformable to reason."<sup>16</sup> And morality, according to Hume, is concerned with such affections, passions and actions. And since reason has no influence on the affections, passions, etc., therefore, morality cannot be "conclusions of our reason".<sup>17</sup> "As long as it is allowed, that reason has no influence on our passions and actions, it is in vain to pretend that morality is discovered only by a deduction of reason. An inactive principle can never be founded on an active; and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts 'tself in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings".<sup>18</sup>

On this basis, Hume states that it is only sense-perception which can be regarded as the source of morality. And all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, etc., fall under the denomination of sense perception. And since perception is either an impression or an idea which is discrete and unconnected, therefore, every, conception of morality will also be separate. Just as in the sphere of epistemology Hume rejects universality and necessity, similarly in the sphere of morality he does not regard moral conceptions as universal and necessity. Just as ontologically Hume is a pluralist, similarly in the sphere of morality also he is a pluralist.

But Kant rejects Hume's pluralism which is based on the distinction of knowledge between relations of ideas and matters of fact. The two also differ on the conception of moral laws, Hume derives them from the empirical world whereas Kant, from the noumenal world, though moral actions are performed in the phenomenal world. They also disagree on the concept of reason. For Kant, it is active, whereas for Hume it is passive. In Kant's analysis, the activity of reason consists in providing universality and necessity to the moral laws. Unlike Hume, who derives moral conceptions from sense-perceptions and regards them as contingent and probable, for Kant, moral laws cannot be derived from sensibility because sensibility cannot

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

provide universality and necessity to the moral laws. Moral laws, according to Kant, must be a priori and only such laws can be commanded. A moral law, in order to become a command, "has to set altogether the influence of inclination".<sup>19</sup> because a law derived from inclination cannot be commanded. Similarly, a moral law cannot be derived from love, because actions done out of love, for instance—love your neighbour—"cannot be commanded".<sup>20</sup> Kant, thus, maintains that moral laws can be derived neither from sensibility nor from inclination, but only from reason, so that they can be regarded as a command to all rational beings under all circumstances whatsoever.

The command, which lies in the moral laws, is regarded by Kant as a categorical imperative, which "is a law which does not depend on our desire for particular consequences and does not even prescribe any particular actions, all it imposes on us is lawabidingness for its own sake—the conformity of actions to universal law as such". This law appears to us as a law that we ought to obey for its own sake. "<sup>21</sup> A categorical imperative demands an unconditional obedience to the moral laws for their own sake and not for the sake of any other higher end. Otherwise they would become a hypothetical imperative, by which Kant means "a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will)".<sup>22</sup> A hypothetical imperative can relate to an action commanded for the attainment of something else, that is to say, it is used as a means to the attainment of some end. But a categorical imperative imposes a lawabidingness, that is to say, moral laws ought to be obeyed for their own sake, only then a human action can be regarded as morally good. 'A human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination—still less because it is done from self-interest—but because it is done for the sake of duty'.<sup>23</sup>

19 H.J. Paton . *The Moral Law*, p. 66

20 Ibid., p. 65

21 Ibid., p. 22.

22 Ibid., p. 78.

23 Ibid., p. 19.

The moral worth of an action lies only in obeying the moral laws for their own sake. Kant calls it as "duty for the sake of duty". There is no moral worth in actions which are performed either out of the fear of punishment or with a view to gain some advantage. An action is morally good only if it is done out of the motive of duty. Kant says, "It is the motive of duty, not the motive of inclination, that gives moral worth of an action"<sup>24</sup>. The motive of performing one's own duty does not depend on the results it produces or attempts to produce. Kant writes, "An action done from duty has its moral worth, not from the result it attains or seeks to attain, but from a formal principle or maxim—the principle of doing one's own duty"<sup>25</sup>.

That which gives moral worth to an action is the maxim of doing one's duty for its own sake. Kant defines a maxim as that "upon which we act. It is a purely personal principle".<sup>26</sup> It is a subjective principle of action, a principle upon which a subject does actually act. Kant distinguishes a subjective principle from an objective principle. An objective principle "is one on which every rational agent would necessarily act if reason had full control over his actions, and therefore one on which he ought to act"<sup>27</sup>. Kant further explains, "only when we act on objective principles do they become also subjective, but they continue to be objective whether we act on them or not"<sup>28</sup>. Moral laws, according to Kant, are objective principles and they become a subjective principle when a rational being acts on those principles. It may be noted here that Kant is using the expression subjective principle not in usual philosophical sense where the subjective as relative is counterposed to the objective as something absolute. By subjective principles, Kant simply means moral principles which are being accepted and obeyed by the moral subject.

Kant states that the maxim of doing one's duty for its own

<sup>24</sup> Ibid

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p 20.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>28</sup> Ibid

sake is a purely formal maxim. "Such a maxim is empty of any particular matter . it is not a maxim of satisfying particular desires or attaining particular results . it is a formal maxim".<sup>29</sup> A morally good action is possible only by virtue of its form and not at all in virtue of its content, because only form can be regarded as universal and necessary, and consequently valid for all rational beings. The form of a maxim is regarded by Kant as duty, because it can "compel obedience"<sup>30</sup> Such a maxim is "imposed on us"<sup>31</sup> not by anything else but as "self-imposed"<sup>32</sup> It is in this sense that for Kant moral laws become subjective principles Being self-imposed, it is the duty of every rational being to act out of the respect for the moral laws : "Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law"<sup>33</sup> Since the moral laws are the results of the rationality of man, therefore an attitude of reverence towards the moral laws is an integral part of Kant's views on morality This means that unless man has a reverence towards moral laws, he will not care to obey them

The moral laws, according to Kant, ought to be obeyed for their own sake. In doing so, they manifest a good will Kant says, " . good will is manifested in acting for the sake of duty"<sup>34</sup> Good will lies at the moment of willing a maxim and "it is good through its willing alone that is good in itself"<sup>35</sup> The goodness of good will, according to Kant, does not depend on the results it produces Therefore the concept of moral responsibility of the moral actions does not depend on the results of moral actions. In Kant's view moral responsibility lies in the willing alone, because whereas the consequences are dependent upon the laws of nature in the phenomenal world, willing is due to man's free rational nature And if the willing of a maxim is good, then it continues to "have its unique goodness even where, by some misfortune, it

29 Ibid , p 21

30 Ibid

31 Ibid

32 Ibid

33 Ibid

34 Ibid., p. 18

35 Ibid , p 61

is unable to produce the results at which it aims".<sup>36</sup> On this basis, Kant says :

"The only thing that is good without qualification or restriction is a good will. That is to say, a good will alone is good in all circumstances and in that sense is an absolute or unconditioned good. We may also describe it as the only thing that is good in itself, good independently of its relation to other things"<sup>37</sup>

The goodness of good will, according to Kant, lies in the form of a maxim which has a law for its own sake. It possesses universality and necessity, and is performed for its own sake. This is what he means by the categorical imperative and the concept of duty. Thus moral laws are categorical imperatives and he assigns to them an unconditional obedience. Kant gives three such maxims and he also interrelates them.

The first maxim "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"<sup>38</sup>

This maxim implies, "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law".<sup>39</sup>

Every moral action ought to be in conformity with the universal law which "serve the will as its principle."<sup>40</sup> Kant illustrates this maxim through the examples of breaking promises and committing suicide. A promise "with the intention of not keeping it"<sup>41</sup> is not a duty, because the maxim underlying it is a device to extricate oneself from current difficulties. Moreover, if everybody makes false promises, then promises will cease to be made. Therefore, breaking promises cannot be universalized.

On the other hand, if a man makes promise-keeping as one of his maxims of action, he is adopting a maxim that could be followed by everyone. Kant states that keeping promises will

36 Ibid , p 17

37 Ibid

38 Ibid , p 84

39 Ibid , p 67

40 I. id

41 Ibid

generally be of advantage to oneself. But one would be acting from duty, if one had kept one's promise even if by doing so, one would have been in disadvantage. In this case, what determines one's maxim is one's rational concern not to do what one could not recommend everyone to do. Keeping promises is at the same time one's obedience to the maxim of universal law, which depends on the "impartiality between myself and others".<sup>42</sup> Therefore Kant states that promise-keeping would be a maxim of action which can be followed by every rational being.

Similar is the case with committing suicide. To commit suicide out of disgust with life is not moral because it will lead to the annihilation of human life if it is universalised. On the other hand, if a man does not commit suicide even out of disgust with life, he would be adopting a maxim which can be followed by everyone.

Kant states that while willing a maxim on the basis of universal law, it has to be maintained that the willing of this kind is always to be considered also as an absolute end and never simply as a means, because, "every rational being, exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use of this or that will, he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end".<sup>43</sup>

The second maxim: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end".<sup>44</sup>

Kant illustrates this maxim through his previous examples of committing suicide and breaking promises. To commit suicide out of disgust with life cannot be considered as moral, because here man "is making use of a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable state of affairs till the end of his

42 H. J. Paton "Kant's Ideas of Good"; *Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society*: New Series, vol. XLV 1944-45, Harrison and Sons Ltd. London, 1945, p. xv.

43 H. J. Paton, *The Moral Law*, p. 90.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

life”<sup>45</sup> He is treating himself as a means to the removal of the disgust of life and is not regarding himself as an end.

Similarly, by making a false promise, say, by not paying a debt, one is making use of another person as a means and is not regarding the person as an end.

On the other hand, an action can be regarded as a duty if every rational being in all his actions regards himself as well as others as an end. To regard every rational being as an end and never as a means is indeed a great contribution of Kant in the history of moral philosophy. The maxim of end-in-itself is related to the maxim of universal law in the sense that while the latter states that one ought always to act on a maxim which can be willed, as a universal law; the former states that the willing of this kind is always to be considered as an absolute end and never simply as a means.

The third maxim - “So act as if you were through your maxim a law making member of a kingdom of ends.”<sup>47</sup>

Kant defines a kingdom as a “systematic union of different rational beings under common laws”<sup>48</sup> Every rational being derives his actions from the maxim of universal law and in all his actions, he regards himself and other rational beings always as ends. In doing so, “there arises a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws—that is a kingdom”<sup>49</sup> Through the maxim of kingdom of ends, Kant attempts to bring out complete harmony between the maxim of universal law and the maxim of end-in-itself. The union of rational beings as an end and governed by universal laws, is regarded by Kant as a kingdom of ends. Moral laws ought to be such as can be willed at the same time as a universal law and the willing of such maxims ought to be regarded at the same as an end-in-itself. There should also be a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws and this in turn constitutes a kingdom of ends. Kant, in this way, maintains

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p 34

48 Ibid., p. 95

49 Ibid.

that every rational being is an end united in a kingdom governed by universal laws.

These three maxims of Kant's moral laws cannot be derived from sensibility, they are a priori and derived from reason. And since reason belongs to the rational will, so these maxims are derived from the rational will. Kant says, "...morality consists in the relations of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This making of laws must be found in every rational being himself and must be able to spring from his will"<sup>50</sup> These maxims manifest autonomy of the will, because they are self-imposed. Every rational being makes these maxims and subjects himself to follow them. The maxim of kingdom of ends, which brings the harmony between the maxim of universal law and the maxim of end in-itself, is itself made by every rational being. On this basis, Kant regards every rational being both as a member and as a head of the kingdom of ends. Every rational being is a member, "when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself subject to these laws"<sup>51</sup> He belongs to it as its head, "When as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other".<sup>52</sup> In this way, every rational being is subject to the laws which he himself makes and this is what Kant means by the autonomy of will, which in his analysis is identical with the freedom of the will. Kant says, "A rational being must always regard himself as making laws in a kingdom of ends which is possible through freedom of the will"<sup>53</sup>

These maxims are in conformity with the concept of duty, only when they are performed for their own sake and not for the sake of any other higher end. For instance, the maxim of universal law can follow the concept of duty only when it is performed for its own sake without taking into account either the advantages or disadvantages springing from the obedience of these laws. Similar is the case with the maxim

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.



of end-in-itself and kingdom of ends. These maxims can be in conformity with the concept of the categorical imperative only when they are regarded as the necessary commands and they have a law-abidingness for their own sake. Kant, thus, holds that these maxims are expressed in the form of a categorical imperative as the necessary commands of duty.

These maxims, according to Kant, can manifest a goodwill, only when one asks oneself - whether the willing of one's maxim can be regarded at the same time as a universal law or not? Whether in willing of a maxim one can regard oneself and others as an end or not? And since these laws are a priori they can be derived from reason which itself belongs to the rational will. The laws of the rational will are the laws of freedom and freedom itself belongs to the rational will. And since these laws are self-imposed, so "freedom would become identical with autonomy, and a free will would be a will under moral law"<sup>54</sup>. Thus in Kant's views on morality freedom of will, rational will, autonomy of will are identical concepts and they are related to the concept of goodwill, duty, categorical imperative and maxims of morality.

From the above it follows that moral laws can be derived neither from the existence of God nor from the immortality of soul, but only from the freedom of will. Without freedom of will there is no possibility of any moral law whatsoever. For Kant moral laws are imposed on rational beings, not by God, but by their own free will. In obeying the moral laws, the rational being obeys the laws which he recognizes as his own. Every rational being, therefore, is both a member and a head of the kingdom of ends. This view of Kant may be described as non-theological because from this point of view, moral laws can be analysed and pursued without any reference to God or a divine command. Yet in spite of this Kant states that it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

Kant assumes the existence of God on the basis that though the only thing that is good without qualification is the goodwill, yet goodwill is not the highest good. Moral laws are supposed

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p. 39.

to "promote the highest good ; and it is not merely our privilege but a necessity connected with duty as a requisite to presuppose the possibility of this good. This presupposition is made only under the condition of the existence of God, and this condition inseparably connects this supposition with duty. Therefore, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God"<sup>55</sup> Kant, therefore, regards the existence of God as the necessary condition for the moral laws and being the necessary condition it is called by Kant as a postulate of moral laws.

But moral laws, according to Kant, can promote the highest good only if the will of every rational being is in perfect accord with the moral laws. In his analysis, a rational being can bring his will in complete fitness with the moral laws only if he succeeds in eliminating the base impressions and thus achieves what Kant calls a holy will. This is possible only in a process going on ad infinitum and this endless progress is possible only if the soul is immortal. Therefore, moral laws, require "an infinitely enduring existence and personality of the same rational being, this is called the immortality of soul"<sup>56</sup> On this basis, Kant regards the immortality of soul as a necessary condition and a postulate of moral laws.

Kant, in this way, regards immortality of soul and existence of God as the necessary conditions (postulates) of moral laws. But no moral law is possible without freedom of will. Therefore freedom of will constitutes the most pivotal aspect for the source and substance of Kant's moral laws. And since these three postulates of moral laws constitute the realm of spiritual (noumenal), therefore Kant's realm of spiritual (noumenal) tries to justify his moral laws.

It may be pointed out that though Kant derives the moral laws from the noumenal world, yet his moral laws have to be fulfilled in the phenomenal world. Kant conceives the non-menal world to provide the forms (the laws) of morality which have to be applied to the actions which are performed in the phenomenal world, in order to judge whether an action is

55 Kant . *Critique of Practical Reason*, p 130.

56 Ibid , p. 127

moral or not. Just as in the sphere of epistemology, Kant derives categories from understanding, similarly in the sphere of morality, he derives moral laws from the noumenal world. Just as in the sphere of epistemology, Kant regards the a priori activity of human mind as the centre because it is the human mind which actively forms the categories and actively organizes the sensible intuitions under specific categories, similarly in the sphere of morality Kant regards the rational being as the maker of the moral laws. For Kant, man is the centre both for epistemology as well as morality. But the sphere of epistemology, according to Kant, is distinct from the sphere of morality, and this distinction is concerned with the question of the criterion for judging an action whether it is moral or not. In his view, the criterion for judging an action cannot be derived from the laws of nature where the consequences of actions take place. The criterion for judging moral actions, lies in the willing alone and it excludes the knowledge of the objective reality where the willing is to be actualized.

But there are limitations involved in Kant's views on morality. The basic limitation lies in the attempt of separating ought from is, willing from action and freedom from necessity. The consequence of such a separation is that Kant regards the willing of a maxim as the absolute criterion for judging the goodness or badness of moral actions without taking into account objective reality and its knowledge where the willing of a maxim can possibly be actualized.

But moral actions, as Kant admits, have to be performed in the concrete human affair, i.e., in objective reality. So we find that the knowledge of objective reality is inseparably linked with the willing of any maxim whatsoever. It may be illustrated by Kant's own example of keeping promises. Thus the keeping of an appointment not only depends upon the existence of certain infrastructures, like—road, buses, taxis, railways, aeroplane, telegrams, etc., but also the knowledge and means for making use of them. So a villager, who comes to a metropolitan city and cannot use the facilities available to him, may not succeed in keeping the appointment with the willing alone. Here the question is that the agent of an action has not only to have the willing alone, but must

also have to make all efforts to obtain the knowledge and means which will lead to the fulfilment of his appointment. That is to say, mere willing, without the efforts on the basis of the cognition of objective reality, cannot be excluded from the criterion of morality. This example, instead of separating epistemology from morality, brings out a dialectical relationship between them.

But Kant, within the framework of his moral laws, does not include the cognitive aspect of objective reality. Consequently his moral laws become purely formal which excludes all content and specification. Therefore in order to derive a specific duty, the knowledge of objective reality is indispensable. In other words, the conceptions of morality are derived in the last analysis from the socio-economic structure of a society in a given historical epoch. In this context Dr Suman Gupta says .

"To examine the values of a society at a certain stage of historical development, a study of the economic structure of (the) society is indispensable. For the values of an economy based on land are very different from the values of an economy based on large-scale industries, to say this is not to commit naturalistic fallacy because the economic structure of a society and its values are not identical. In fact the values, though based on economic structure, acquire an independent status of their own and may hinder or help a change in the economic structure" <sup>57</sup>

Thus the conceptions of morality must be regarded as historically and dialectically related to the knowledge of the conditions where they have to be performed. And at the moment of willing a maxim, unlike Kant, the knowledge of objective reality is indispensable. In the process of such an analysis, there arise two types of morality, namely, the actual morality and the ideal morality. Dr Suman Gupta says, "the actual morality cannot be separated from the concrete historical milieu which shapes the consciousness of the individual and his concepts of good and evil. And the ideal morality is concerned

57 Dr Suman Gupta : "Corruption and Values" in *K. Damodaran, Volume 1977*, ed. by K. Surendra Nath, Dweepi Printers, Trivandrum, 1977, pp. 48-49

with creating conditions for the full and harmonious development of man's social nature".<sup>58</sup> The actual morality is ultimately based on the actual relations of men in the process of their activity. But from the contradictions in the actual relations of men, there arises a conception of an ideal morality which strives towards the future and in the present, it aims at changing the actual relations of men. It has to be pointed out that "not only the actual value system but even the ideal value system is related to fact. To be meaningful, that is to embody the possibility of being achieved, ideal value system should be derived from an investigation of best human conditions of existence obtainable".<sup>59</sup>

Unlike Kant, the dialectical relationship between morality and epistemology shows that not only the actual morality is related to objective reality, but the ideal morality is also related to objective reality, because it aims at creating certain conditions where it can possibly be actualized.

But Kant's moral laws are not aimed at changing the objective reality where moral actions have to be performed. It is evident from Kant's initial position that the "willing" of a maxim requires neither the knowledge of the objective reality, nor can it be qualified by the results of the actions. It Kant's view the goodness and badness of moral actions depend on the "willing" of a maxim and if the willing is good, then it continues to have its unique goodness even if it produces a bad result. It becomes evident that Kant's definition of "good" is circular because it assumes the definiendum in the definiens. But the important point is that Kant confines the goodness of "goodwill" within its ideality and does not attempt towards actualizing it, by creating the objective conditions where it can possibly be actualized. It may be recalled that Kant's epistemology, as I have discussed in the second, third and fourth chapters, is also not aimed at changing the objec-

58 Dr Suman Gupta · "Conceptual Analysis of Morality," in *Socialist Panorama*, ed. by Om Prakash Mantri, volume 2, no. 7, July 1981, New Delhi, p. 7

59 Dr Suman Gupta · "Corruption and Values," *K. Damodaran Volume* 1977, p. 49

tive world because it is confined to the knowledge of the appearances. But man can change a thing and make it serve his own purposes only on the basis of the knowledge of its essential causal relations and such a knowledge requires from going behind the appearances to the essence of things. Therefore the valid epistemological position, as opposed to Kant, should be of such a nature on the basis of which man is able to change the objective reality.

In the process of changing objective reality, man realizes the ideal morality in the concrete objective reality. The realization of ideal morality depends on two fundamental limitations. The first arises out of the specific nature of objective reality itself. Unless objective reality is sufficiently evolved, it will not be possible for ideal morality to be actualized in it. And the second limitation is involved in the knowledge of the various components of objective reality. Unless objective reality is comprehensively cognized with all its necessary causal interconnection, it will not be possible for ideal morality to be actualized in the concrete objective reality.

The realization of ideal morality in the actuality of concrete human relations is where freedom manifests itself and it is for the sake of the realization of freedom that the ideality of morality strives towards its actuality. Therefore, freedom does not consist in the independence from the necessary causal laws of objective reality as Kant maintains, but in the knowledge of those causal laws with the aims of transforming man's relations in objective reality, i. e. man's relation to nature. Freedom is a historically developing cognition of the essential causal relations between man and nature vis-a-vis man and society, and acting in accordance with that causal necessity with the aim of transforming those relations. Freedom is not something which can be attained once and for all, as Kant holds, because for him, freedom belongs to the will which is independent of actions. But in the reality of concrete human affairs, freedom cannot be attained irrevocably. On the contrary, in the reality of man's activity and existence, freedom can be regarded only as a process, as a continuum, and it can be realized only in the process of transforming objective reality. And such a knowledge itself is possible only in the process of their transformation and

thereby opening a new epoch of progress. Thus the concept of freedom, unlike that of Kant, consists in the knowledge of the laws of the social nexus, spatio-temporal framework, earthly existence, historical and actual life of man, and acting in accordance with that knowledge with the aim of transforming that reality. And man realizes freedom only by actualizing his ideal morality in the reality of his activity within the sphere of its possibility. And the willing of an ideal morality is itself based on the knowledge of the contradictions in the reality of man's activity and existence. Thus it is epistemology that bridges the gulf between the ought and is, between willing and action, between freedom and necessity. On this basis, man while comprehending objective reality, would be able to realize himself in willing and action.

To sum up, the limitations in Kant's views on morality can be overcome, if epistemology is regarded as a link between the ought and the is, between willing and action, between freedom and necessity. And epistemological position should be of such a nature which leads towards the changing of objective reality and thereby actualizing the ideality of ought, willing and freedom. Such a dialectical relationship between morality and epistemology seems to be free from the limitations of Kant's morality and will lead to an effective solution to the problems of morality.

## Conclusion

While examining Kant's philosophy as a whole, it was found that he critically examines the philosophical trends during his time and his philosophy exercises a tremendous influence on the succeeding philosophical thought. Amid the two conflicting trends of rationalism and empiricism, Kant critically investigates the capacities of both reason and sensibility. He brings out certain contradictions inherent in reason with itself and such contradictions, he claims, cannot be resolved. Hegel attempts to resolve those contradictions. But Hegel does so within the framework of idealism. It is on this point that Marx's philosophy may be viewed as an emendation of Kantian philosophy.

Kant's philosophical system tries to determine the validity and limit of scientific knowledge to the sphere of phenomenon, on the one hand, and, on the other, it opens a sphere of faith wherein lies the basis of moral laws. Kant attempts to justify science and morality by separating the one from the other.

For Kant, to ask what are the conditions which make scientific knowledge possible, is to ask about the conditions which make synthetic a priori judgements possible. As synthetic, it amplifies the concept of predicate and as a priori, it expresses universality and necessity. What we seek in science,



according to Kant, is such an ampliative knowledge with the characteristics of universality and necessity

For Kant, scientific knowledge requires an ontological existence of matter and a necessary causal connection in it. The former condition is expressed by him in terms of the thing-in-itself and the latter one is regarded by him as a priori. The thing-in-itself acts on the senses and provides material basis for scientific cognition. These materials given in sensible-intuitions are regarded by Kant as brute facts, discrete and unconnected. In this context, he agrees with Hume that no universal and necessary causal laws can be found in the sphere of matters of fact. For Hume, whatever appears to be necessary in impressions and ideas can be accounted for by the laws of association based on customary transition, habits, etc. Hume, in this way, confines human cognition within the limits of the given and eliminates universal and necessary causal laws which put scientific knowledge on secure grounds.

For Kant, scientific knowledge is impossible within the framework of Hume's philosophy because universal and necessary causal laws cannot be conceived within it. Kant tries to show that universality and necessity in scientific cognition are more than products of sensible intuitions or, in other words, they are applicable to sensible intuitions without arising from them. Kant, therefore, regards universal and necessary causal laws as a priori. And he tries to establish this point in the transcendental deduction of the categories of understanding. On this basis, he regards Hume's philosophy as an abdication of the necessity in scientific cognition. Hume's attempt of attributing general ideas to the force of customary transitions and habits are, for Kant, tantamount to a denial of the a priori activity of the human mind. Thus for Kant universal and necessary causal laws in scientific knowledge are introduced by the categories of understanding.

But the concepts of understanding, according to Kant have their limits; that is to say, they are limited to the sphere of phenomena. And if they are applied to something which can never be given in sensible intuitions, then they cease to be valid and there arises a transcendental illusion. In Kant's analysis, transcendental illusions are unavoidable and they can neither be

proved nor disproved. In the transcendental dialectic, Kant discusses the transcendental illusion and tries to expose the illusions in the judgements on what is transcendent. But transcendental illusion, according to Kant, is something which the transcendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve. It is in this context that Kant criticizes the concept of reason itself and brings out the antinomies which create a conflict of reason with itself. He tries to curb and curtail the dogmatic pretensions of reason. He prevents reason from presenting the unconditioned in reality. The unconditioned is regarded by him as an idea of reason, and it is unknown and unknowable, because, no synthetic a priori judgement can be made on it. The sphere of ideas of reason become the postulates of Kant's moral laws, but they have been transformed in such a way that there remains an unbridgeable gulf between scientific knowledge and morality.

The transcendental illusion in which Kant brings out the contradictions inherent in reason with itself, gives rise to the development of Hegel's dialectics. Hegel appreciates Kant's dialectics in so far as it regards contradictory characteristics of reason. But Hegel vehemently criticizes Kantian dialectics because it cannot resolve those contradictions. According to Hegel, Kant's dialectics is defective because in it the infinite and the finite, the unconditioned and the conditioned, the identity and the difference are so opposed to one another that the one excludes the other. Hegel, as opposed to Kant, regards every entity as identical with itself and by virtue of its self-identity, it is different from all other entities. Therefore, identity and difference, for Hegel, are identical-within-difference.

Hegel criticizes Kant's dialectics because Kant uses dialectics only as a negative method in order to expose transcendental illusions. Hegel, on the other hand, uses dialectics not only as a negative method but also as a positive method, so that a phenomenon can be known in its entirety. The absolute totality of conditions, which is transcendental illusion in Kant's dialectics, becomes the starting point of Hegelian dialectics. Hegel attempts to comprehend the absolute totality in all its fractional parts and sub-parts. Hegel's dialectics revolves around the pre-mundane absolute spirit which is always in a

process of position, negation and negation of negation. In this way, Hegel's dialectics comprehends all the contradictory moments and tries to reconcile them with reason which gives their reality in their unity.

But Marx differs from Hegel's dialectics on the ground that the dialectics which is operating among the objects in Hegelian philosophy, are not the dialectics of the objects. Since for Hegel, an object gets its objectivity from the spirit, being an externalization of it, so the dialectics which operates among the objects, are ultimately the dialectics of the spirit. As opposed to Hegel, Marx holds that it is in the concrete objective reality that dialectical laws evolve and they are discovered through man's centuries of practical and cognitive activities. Though Marx borrows heavily from Hegel, yet he does so in such a way that he has transformed Hegel's idealistic dialectics into his materialistic dialectics. For Marx, Hegel is wrong in saying that the self-development of spirit is the real development of objects because objects are 'an-othering' of the spirit. Marx rejects Hegel's stress on the ontological primacy of spirit and consequently his confinement within idealism. For Marx, the dialectical movement in thought is derived from the actual movement of the real world.

Marx appreciates Kant's constitutive activity of human mind in the knowledge-process. But whereas such an activity in Kant is abstracted from facts, Marx regards both the subject and the object as equally active in the knowledge-process. Kant's thing-in-itself remains unknown and unknowable, precisely because he accepts only one-sided activity in the cognitive-process. As opposed to Kant, for Marx, it is the practical activity whereby man comes across objective reality and understands its necessary causal laws so as to transform it. And if man can transform a thing and make it serve his own purposes, he essentially cannot regard it as unknown and unknowable. Thus the problems of scientific cognition are properly solved in the dialectical materialism of Marx.

To sum up, though the problems of real and scientific knowledge cannot be solved within the framework of Kant's philosophy, yet in the process of reconciling the claims of

rationalism and empiricism, Kant raises certain problems of epistemology on the basis of which there develops the dialectics of Hegel, on the one hand, and dialectical materialism of Karl Marx, on the other. It is in this context that Kant's contribution to European philosophical thought is appreciated.

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